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Abstract
This dissertation consists of three essays. The first essay examines the unintended conse-
quence of Medicare pay-for-performance programs. I find evidence that the CMS case mix
adjustment formula for patient experience measures in the Hospital Value-based Purchasing
Program (HVBP) over-corrects (under-corrects) for the effect of patient health status on
favorable survey responses for surgical (obstetric) patients, which creates scope for hospital
to risk select patients on the basis of health status. Using inpatient discharge data from
Pennsylvania and Maryland, I find that average patient severity increased among surgical
patients and decreased among obstetric patients after the HVBP took effect. In addition, I
find weak evidence of an increase in patient experience measures as a result of the HVBP,
but no such effect is found for clinical process measures.
In the second essay, I estimate the short-term effect of depression on labor market out-
comes using data from the 2004-2009 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey. After accounting
for the endogeneity of depression through a correlated random effects panel data specifica-
tion, I find that depression reduces the contemporaneous probability of employment by 2.6
percentage points. I do not find evidence of a causal relationship between depression and
hourly wages or weekly hours worked. In addition, I examine the effect of depression on work
impairment and found that depression increases annual work loss days by about 1.4 days
(33 percent), which implies that the annual aggregate productivity loses due to depression
range from $700 million to 1.4 billion in 2009 USD.
In the third essay, I investigate the health impacts of unconventional natural gas devel-
opment of Marcellus shale in Pennsylvania between 2001 and 2013. Through a multivariate
regression analysis that compares changes in hospitalization rates over time for air pollution-
sensitive disease in counties with unconventional gas wells to changes in hospitalization rates
in non-well counties, I find significant associations between shale gas development and hos-
pitalizations for acute myocardial infarction (AMI), chronic obstructive pulmonary disease
1
(COPD), asthma, pneumonia, and upper respiratory infections (URI). These adverse effects
on health are consistent with higher levels of air pollution resulting from unconventional
natural gas development.
2
Chapter 1
Introduction
The Affordable Care Act (ACA) mandates that the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Ser-
vices (CMS) incorporate pay-for-performance (P4P) adjustments into Medicare payments.
In response, CMS has begun to implement several P4P programs that are aimed at pro-
moting quality and efficiency in the delivery of inpatient care. To ensure fair and accurate
comparison of providers’ quality, proper “risk adjustment” of the metrics used to determine
P4P payments plays a critical role. The second chapter of this dissertation examines the
unintended consequences of P4P programs when measures of providers’ quality are not fully
adjusted for the differences in patient characteristics. Using data from various sources, I
study how the Hospital Value-based Purchasing Program (HVBP), Medicare’s flagship P4P
program, affects the patient mix treated at participating hospitals. I find consistent ev-
idence that hospitals engaged in patient selection through exploiting the incomplete case
mix adjustment used by CMS to set payment under the HVBP. In light of recent health
care reforms, the findings in this paper have important policy implications. A good case
mix adjustment (risk adjustment) method is critical to implementing large-scale public P4P
initiatives like the HVBP. Since patient mix varies greatly among different types of hospitals
in the U.S., hospitals treating certain patient populations will be unfairly penalized if the
performance measures are not fully risk-adjusted. By implication, if safety net hospitals that
3
operate in low-income areas consistently under-perform on quality measures mainly due to
the patient mix, they may avoid certain types of patients that are likely to lower their per-
formance scores, which could in turn widen the disparities in access to care for vulnerable
populations.
In addition to P4P, I am also interested in the impact of the ACA on other aspects
of the health care system. Under the individual and small group exchange provisions of
the ACA, a large number of previously uninsured individuals with severe mental disorders
will gain coverage. Thus, a correct understanding of economic costs associated with mental
disorders is important when evaluating the welfare effects of such initiatives. In the third
chapter of this dissertation, I investigate how depression, one of the most common mental
health disorders among U.S. adults, affects individuals’ short-term job market opportunities.
Using panel data techniques, I find that in the short-run, depression has limited adverse
effects on key labor market indicators such as employment, wages, or weekly hours worked,
but a large effect on workplace productivity loss. These results imply that from a social
standpoint part of the costs of coverage expansions under the ACA may be offset through
less productivity loss.
Although most of my research focuses on the health care system, I have also con-
ducted research on other topics of broad policy interest. For example, while the boom of
unconventional natural gas development (i.e. “fracking”) has contributed significantly to
energy security in the U.S., it has also raised public health concerns among policy makers
and the general public. However, to date most evidence on adverse health effects of uncon-
ventional natural gas development is anecdotal. This lack of rigorous scientific evidence has
resulted in a debate on the safety of unconventional natural gas development that is founded
on speculations, making it difficult for regulators to establish appropriate policies. In the last
chapter, I examine the health impacts of the unconventional natural gas development of Mar-
cellus shale in Pennsylvania between 2001 and 2011. I find significant associations between
shale gas development and hospitalizations for air-pollution-sensitive conditions among adult
4
residents in Pennsylvania. This is the first study that establishes a consistent link between
unconventional natural gas development and higher rates of disease.
5
Chapter 2
Patient Selection Under Incomplete
Case Mix Adjustment: Evidence from
the Hospital Value-based Purchasing
Program
2.1 Introduction
Historically, hospitals treating Medicare patients are reimbursed on the basis of the quantity
of services provided. In the early years after its establishment in 1965, Medicare used a
fee-for-service payment model that fully reimburses health care providers for the cost of
treatment. Under such a system, hospitals have incentives to oversupply medical services
to patients because they do not bear the marginal cost of treatment. In October 1983,
Medicare implemented the prospective payment system under which hospitals are paid a
flat rate for treating patients with similar conditions. This payment scheme also incentivizes
hospitals to strategically choose the extent of treatment, since sicker patients are more costly
to treat. Ellis (1998) shows that prospectively paid health care providers have incentives
to oversupply medical services to low cost patients and undersupply services to high cost
patients. Moreover, providers have no incentives to improve the quality of care if payments
are solely based on volume.
In recent years, public policy makers and private insurers have become increasingly
interested in the pay-for-performance (P4P) schemes, which reward providers that demon-
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strate their services are high quality. With the passage of the Affordable Care Act (ACA),
the focus has now been shifted toward containing cost growth and promoting better quality
of care. In response, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) inaugurated the
Hospital Value-Based Purchasing Program (HVBP) as an effort to improve the quality of
inpatient care. The HVBP is the first large-scale public P4P program that affects acute care
hospitals nationwide. Due to the increasing popularity of P4P schemes among the public and
private payers, there is a growing literature on the economic evaluation of the effectiveness
and efficiency of such quality initiatives. In general, there is mixed evidence regarding the
effectiveness of P4P on improving the quality of care (for example, see Mullen, Frank and
Rosenthal, 2010; Rosenthal et al., 2005; Li et al., 2014; Ryan, Blustein and Casalino, 2012;
Werner et al., 2011).
One potential unintended consequence inherent with this type of quality initiative
is that providers may avoid patients that will lower their performance (Shen, 2003). Stud-
ies have found a correlation between providers’ performance scores under P4P and patient
characteristics. In particular, Chien et al. (2012) find that physician groups that serve in
low-income areas of California received lower performance scores in a major P4P program.
Jha, Orav and Epstein (2011) find that hospitals that care for greater number of elderly
black and Medicaid patients are less likely to have high quality ratings. If the measures
used to evaluate providers’ quality of care are not fully adjusted for the differences in patient
population of each provider, they may strategically engage in patient selection in order to
increase their performance ratings.1
Ideally, if one is to eliminate the scope for patient selection in P4P programs, the
performance measures should be selected in a way such that they are not affected by patient
characteristics. One example of such a measure would be the percentage of cases where
1The quality measures commonly used in P4P programs fall into 4 categories (James, 2012): (1) pro-
cess measures of the performance of clinically-validated activities that contribute to good health outcomes;
(2) outcome measures of the effects of health care on patient’s health status; (3) experience measures of
patients’ perceptions of the health care they received; and (4) structural measures of the features of health
care organizations that are related to the ability to provide high-quality health care.
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surgical patients are given proper antibiotics to prevent infection. Clinical activities like this
are under the control of hospitals and are not dependent on patient characteristics or illness
severity. However, in order to attain a comprehensive evaluation of quality of care, the use of
measures that are likely to be correlated with patient characteristics is sometimes necessary
(for example, outcome-based measures like the mortality rate for pneumonia patients). Under
those circumstances, proper adjustment for differences in patient characteristics is critical
to ensure fair comparisons across health care providers serving different patient populations.
For example, safety net hospitals that treat a large share of disadvantaged patients may
rank low in measured quality if outcome-based measures such as mortality rates are not fully
adjusted for patient illness severity (Jha, Orav and Epstein, 2011).
A large number of statistical methods for adjusting patient characteristics have been
developed in the health care industry for such purposes.2 Public payers often use “risk
adjustment”3 to properly set premiums for private insurers under contract to provide services
so that there is no incentive for them to select healthier enrollees or avoid sicker enrollees.
For example, CMS uses risk adjustment models in setting payments to private insurers in
Medicare Advantage (MA) plans. Also, in recent years, both public policy makers and
private payers began publishing “report cards” that publicly report information on health
care providers and their quality of health care, which necessitates detailed and credible
adjustment for patient characteristics (Werner and Asch, 2005). The newly created HVBP
requires that payments are risk adjusted because some of the measures used in the HVBP,
such as patients’ perceptions of their hospital stay, are closely related to their characteristics,
while others are directly based on patient health outcomes (for example, 30-day mortality
rate of heart failure patients). However, almost all current risk-adjusters are criticized for low
explanatory power. With a large portion of the variance in patient outcomes/costs/responses
unexplained, health care providers might still have the ability to “game” the system and
2See Schone and Brown (2013) for a detailed description of these methods.
3”Risk adjustment” refers to the methods for determining whether patient with certain characteristics
have higher utilization of medical services.
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benefit from doing so.
As noted by Dranove et al. (2003), health care providers may have superior infor-
mation on patient conditions than the econometricians. As a result, statistical modeling
may not be able to fully account for the effect of patient characteristics on quality measures
that are based on or closely related to these same factors. Moreover, risk-averse providers
may still want to engage in patient selection even if risk adjustment is accurate on average.
Researchers have found evidence of patient selection in various settings. For example, Dra-
nove et al. (2003) find that publication of health care report cards induce providers to select
healthier patients for heart surgery. In the context of private insurance, Brown et al. (2014b)
find that after CMS introduced risk adjustment in its Medicare Advantage Plans, private
insurers responded by increasing selection of enrollees along dimensions that are excluded
from the CMS risk adjustment formula. In general, incomplete adjustment for patient char-
acteristics creates scope for patient selection, and economic agents tend to respond to this
type of incentives quickly.
In this paper, I investigate hospital behavior under quality incentives with incomplete
adjustment for patient characteristics. The HVBP provides an ideal setting for this type of
study. First, the HVBP employs a set of process measures that are designed to assess the
appropriateness of care provided by hospitals. A clinical process refers to the activities
performed for or by a patient, and process measures assess whether these activities are
properly carried out by health care providers. There is no need to adjust these measures for
patient characteristics since hospitals are not able to improve their performance by avoiding
or attracting particular types of patients. Second, in addition to the process measures,
CMS also includes experience measures (used to assess patient satisfaction) and outcome
measures in the program. Since there is a well-documented correlation between patients’
perceptions for health care and demographic characteristics, CMS uses coefficients from
regression-based models to explicitly adjust these measures for patient characteristics such
as age, educational attainment, self-perceived health, and a set of clinical risk factors in
9
order to “level the playing field for all hospitals” (O’Malley et al., 2005). This is called the
patient case mix adjustment.4 However, if such adjustments are incomplete, then hospitals
will still have an incentive to select patients who are most likely to supply high ratings.
Using data from a large hospital network in Pennsylvania, I find that the CMS patient
case mix adjustment5 formula for patient experience measures have failed to account for the
interactive effects between patient health status and service line,6 thereby failing to account
for differences in patients that affect these experience ratings. My results suggest that
relative to medical patients, obstetric patients who perceive themselves to be sicker tend to
evaluate their hospital experiences more negatively, whereas surgical patients who perceive
themselves to be sicker are more likely to give favorable responses, after conditioning on the
same variables CMS uses in its case mix adjustment formula. As a result, the current CMS
patient case mix adjusters might have created scope for hospitals to systematically select
patients that can increase their scores on experience measures.
Based on these findings, I test whether the implementation of the HVBP results in
selection on the basis of patient illness severity using inpatient discharge data from the states
of Pennsylvania and Maryland from 2009 to 2013. Since acute care hospitals in Maryland
are exempt from the HVBP, I employ a difference-in-differences strategy for identification
using patients and hospitals in Maryland as the comparison group. I find that relative to
patients in Maryland, there is a decrease in average illness severity for obstetric patients
at Pennsylvania hospitals after HVBP became effective, whereas the average illness severity
increased among surgical patients in Pennsylvania. This provides evidence that the HVBP
induced hospitals in Pennsylvania to engage in patient selection in both directions.
4See Appendix 2.7.2 for a detailed description of the CMS patient case mix adjustment method for
experience measures.
5Case mix refers to the type or mix of patients treated by a hospital. Later in this paper, the phrase
“case-mix adjustment” is used interchangeably with “risk adjustment” because they both refer to the practice
of adjusting for differences in patient characteristics.
6O’Malley et al. (2005) find that the most important case-mix adjustment factors are hospital service
line, age, race, level of education, self-perceived health status, language spoken at home, and having a
circulatory disorder. They also find strong interactive effects between service and age , but do not find the
interactions between service line and self-perceived health to have any significant effect on patients responses
on HCAHPS, the survey CMS uses for experience measures in HVBP.
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Finally, I look at changes in HVBP performance measures over time. Relative to
hospitals in Maryland, there is no evidence of improvement in process measures for hospitals
in Pennsylvania. However, I do find that evidence that experience measures increased in
hospitals in Pennsylvania after the implementation of the HVBP, which is consistent with
HVBP-induced changes in hospitals’ patient selection incentives.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2.2 provides an overview of
HVBP; Section 2.3 describes the data; Sections 2.4 and 2.5 presents the empirical strategies
and results, respectively; Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Institutional background
In order to improve the quality of care and contain cost growth, some private insurers employ
the pay-for-performance (P4P)7 schemes adjust payments to health care providers based on
measured quality. A typical P4P program rewards health care providers if they meet certain
quality standard or score highly on agreed-upon performance measures. The underlying
rationale is that if providers’ behavior can be influenced by how they are reimbursed, then
tying financial incentives to the delivery of medical care will lead providers to behave in a way
that results in improved service delivery. The Affordable Care Act (ACA) mandates that
CMS adopt a pay-for-performance program for hospitals nationwide. On April 29, 2011,
CMS issued a rule that finalized the Hospital Value-based Purchasing Program (HVBP)
under the Inpatient Prospective Payment System (IPPS) in federal fiscal year (FY) 2013,
the first year of HVBP implementation. According to CMS, HVBP is aimed at incorporating
P4P into the current Medicare payment system with the intent of promoting better clinical
outcomes for hospital patients as well as improving their experience during hospital stays.
The HVBP program became effective for all Medicare inpatient discharges nationwide
(except for Maryland) occurring after October 1, 2012 (FY 2013) in all eligible acute care
hospitals (CMS, 2012).8 The HVBP is budget-neutral by design: it is funded by first reducing
7Pay-for-performance (P4P) is often used interchangeably with value-based purchasing (VBP).
8Hospitals are not eligible for HVBP if (1) they are excluded from the Inpatient Prospective Payment
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the base operating diagnosis-related group (DRG) payment for all inpatient discharges and
then redistributing these funds among the participating hospitals based on their performance
scores. Under the program, each eligible hospital’s performance is evaluated both in a
performance period and in a baseline period. CMS collects data on an established set of
quality measures in both periods. Hospitals are then scored on each measure for “achievement
points” by comparing their performance to all participating hospitals nationwide during the
performance period. They are also scored for “improvement points” by comparing the data
collected in the performance period to those collected (on themselves) in the baseline period.
For each measure, the final score is the greater of the achievement points or the improvement
points. The combined scores across all measures (total performance score, or TPS) is then
translated to a payment adjustment factor (also called as incentive payment percentage)
that applies to all inpatient discharges during a fiscal year.
One notable feature of the HVBP is that payment adjustment factor in future time
periods will be determined by performance measures in the current period. For example, for
the FY 2013 program, the performance period is July 1, 2011 to March 31, 2012, and the
baseline period is July 1, 2009 to March 31, 2009. For each hospital, performance measures
based on data collected during these two periods are used to determine the payment adjuster
for Medicare inpatient discharges between Oct 1, 2012 and September 30, 2013. I discuss
this feature and its implication in greater detail in the data section.
Beginning Oct 1, 2012, all Medicare inpatient discharges at hospitals that participate
in the HVBP are paid with a certain percentage withholding of the base DGR payment plus
the incentive payment percentage.9 For FY 2013 HVBP, hospitals are evaluated along 12
process measures (70% of TPS) and 8 experience measures (30% of TPS). In the finalized
System (IPPS) (for example, psychiatric, rehabilitation, long-term care, children’s, and cancer hospitals) ;
(2) they did not participate in Hospital Inpatient Quality Reporting (IQR) during the HVBP performance
period; (3) they are cited by the Secretary of Health and Human Services for deficiencies during the per-
formance period that pose an immediate jeopardy to patients health or safety; (4) they do not meet the
minimum number of cases, measures, or surveys required by HVBP (CMS, 2012).
9For example, the amount of withholding is 1 percent of base DRG payments for FY 2013, so if a hospital’s
payment adjustment factor is 1.2 percent, then it is effectively receiving a 0.2 percent bonus for each inpatient
discharge.
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provisions for HVBP in FY 2014 (beginning October 1, 2013) and FY 2015 (beginning
October 1, 2014), CMS sequentially added outcome measures and efficiency measures, and
also changed the relative weights of each domain in the total performance score.10 In addition
to the increase in the number of measures, the amount of withholding was also increased to
1.25% of the base DRG payment for FY 2014 and 1.5% of the base payment for FY 2015.
According to the CMS plan, more measures will be added to the program and the amount of
withholding will be gradually increased to 2 percent of the base DRG payment in FY 2017
(CMS, 2012).
In 2008, the Maryland Health Services Cost Review Commission (Maryland HSCRC)
began implementing the Quality Based Reimbursement Initiative (QBR), which allocated
rewards and penalties for hospitals based on their performance in process of care measures
for heart attack, heart failure, pneumonia, and surgical infection prevention. In FY 2012,
the Maryland HSCRC added experience measures (the same as those in HVBP) to the
QBR program. Due to the consistent design between the Maryland QBR and HVBP, CMS
exempted the acute care hospitals in the state of Maryland from HVBP. Maryland hospitals
began receiving QBR-adjusted payments in FY 2010, and the payment rates were determined
by their performance in calender year (CY) 2008 (Maryland HSCRC, 2011).11 In this paper,
the patients and hospitals in Maryland constitute the comparison group.
2.3 Data
The empirical analysis in this paper relies on data from several sources. First, in order
to evaluate how the HVBP program affects hospital measured quality, I collected hospital
performance data between 2009Q1 and 2013Q2 from Hospital Compare, a website adminis-
tered by CMS that publishes information about the quality of care at hospitals across the
United States. As part of the Hospital Quality Initiative announced by the Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS) in 2001, Hospital Compare began to collect and publish
10See Appendix Table 2.7 for relative domain weights for the first three years of the HVBP.
11The baseline period for the first year of Maryland QBR is CY 2007.
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information on quality of care, patient satisfaction, and pricing and cost of medical services
at hospitals nationwide. Under the HVBP, hospitals are rewarded (or penalized) for their
relative standings in process measures, experience measures, outcome measures (added for
FY 2014), and efficiency measures (added for FY 2015).
In this paper I focus on process measures and experience measures. The main reason
for excluding outcome measures and efficiency measures is that the data collection periods
are inconsistent between public reporting (the data available on Hospital Compare) and the
actual data CMS uses to calculate outcome and efficiency measures).12 Also, because of the
way Hospital Compare archives historical data, only annualized performance data can be
retrieved before 2013, although CMS calculates hospitals performance scores using quarterly
data. The most recently available data are through June 30.
For the FY 2013 HVBP, CMS used the 12 process measures hospitals reported to
Medicare via the Hospital Inpatient Quality Reporting (IQR) program (see Appendix Table
2.9 for these measures).13 All 12 measures are the proportion of patients that received
appropriate care. For example, HF-1 is the proportion of heart failure patients that were
given discharge information. I exclude four measures (AMI-7a, AMI-8a, SCIP-VTE-2, and
SCIP-Inf-4) from the analysis because more than half of the hospitals in both Maryland and
Pennsylvania had missing data on these measures. In addition, information were lacking for
all but two Maryland hospitals in 2011 on 5 measures (SCIP-Card-2, SCIP-VTE-2, SCIP-Inf-
1, SCIP-Inf-2, and SCIP-Inf-2). Therefore, I exclude 2011 for the analysis on these measures.
For each process measure, I only include in the estimation sample hospitals with complete
data for all years. As a result, the final estimation sample contains 135 Pennsylvania hospitals
and 41 Maryland hospitals.14
12For example, the performance period for the 30-day mortality rate for AMI patients in FY 2014 HVBP
is from July 1, 2011 to June 30, 2012. However, the same measure reported in the publicly available 2012
Hospital Compare archived file is based on data collected between July 1, 2009 and June 30, 2012.
13CMS added one process measure to the FY 2014 program. and excluded one measure for FY 2015
program. See Appendix Table 2.9 for details.
14Hospitals can have missing data for a measure when 1) they do not report that measure to CMS, or 2)
there are two few cases so that they become ineligible for that measure.
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The patient experience measures are derived from the Hospital Consumer Assessment
of Healthcare Providers and Systems (HCAHPS).15 The HCAHPS was developed jointly by
the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) and CMS. It was first implemented
in October 2006 and survey results became publicly available in March 2008. HCAHPS
was the first standardized survey allowing comparisons of patient perceptions for inpatient
care across hospitals nationally (Issac et al., 2010). Eligible adult patients with various
medical conditions are randomly selected by HCAHPS between 48 hours and 6 weeks after
discharge.16 The survey includes 33 questions which ask about patient experiences in the
hospital and collect other health and demographic information such as self-assessed health
status, race and ethnicity, and level of education. Based on the responses to a selected set
of questions, CMS calculates and publishes 8 experience of care measures after adjustment
for survey mode,17 non-response, and patient case mix.18 Each measure is the proportion
of patients who gave the “top-box” responses (most positive) on HCAHPS.19 For example,
the measure “pain management” is the proportion of patients who answered that “pain was
always well controlled during the hospital stay”.
Instead of using the total performance scores for clinical process and patient expe-
rience calculated by CMS,20 I use as outcome variables the underlying proportions (rates)
used to derive these scores. The reason for doing this is twofold. First, the CMS compos-
ite scores reflect a hospital’s relative standing among all hospitals nationwide as well as its
improvement over time. For example, a poor performer can earn high composite scores by
substantially improving their ratings over time. Therefore, looking at the composite scores
obscures comparisons across hospitals. Second, using the underlying rates for each individual
15See Appendix 2.7.3 for the survey instrument.
16To be eligible for HCAHPS, patients must be at least 18 years old at admission; have non-psychiatric
principal diagnosis; stay at least one night in the hospital; and be discharged alive.
17The HCAHPS can be administered via mail, telephone, or a combination of the two.
18See Appendix Table 2.10 for a complete list of experience measures.
19To receive an experience of care domain score under HVBP, hospitals must have at least 100 completed
HCAHPS surveys.
20In addition to total performance scores, CMS also publishes separate domain scores for process measures
and experience measures.
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measures allows us to examine the effect of the HVBP on specific and meaningful aspects of
hospital care rather than a simple overall rating.
In addition to collecting aggregate HCAHPS scores for all hospitals in Pennsylvania,
I obtained the HCAHPS survey responses from a large hospital network in Pennsylvania
for 2012 and 2013. I then linked the survey results to the inpatient database obtained
from the same hospital network. The combined dataset contains patients’ responses on
HCAHPS as well as their demographic and diagnostic information. I then subset to eligible
patients with complete surveys, thereby excluding 366 patients from the full sample of 3,729
patients.21 Since the experience of care measures are computed using the top-box responses
for a subset of questions in the survey, I constructed a set of dichotomous indicators for
whether the patient answered the top-box for the questions related to a particular measure
and use these as dependent variables. Following the CMS method for patient case mix
adjustment (Elliott et al., 2009; O’Malley et al., 2005), I assigned patients to three different
service lines (obstetric, surgical, and medical) based on the Diagnostic Related Group (DRG).
Self-assessed health status is a categorical variable that ranges from 1 to 5 (in decreasing
order: excellent, very good, good, fair, poor). Similarly, educational attainment is an ordinal
variable ranging from 1 to 6 in increasing order (8th grade or less, some high school but did
not graduate, high school graduate, some college or 2-year degree, 4-year college graduate,
more than 4-year college degree). The final estimation sample is comprised of 3,363 patients,
among which 6.3 percent are obstetric patients, 33.2 are surgical patients, and 58.5 percent
are medical patients.22
My third data source is the 2009-2013 inpatient discharge data for the states of Penn-
sylvania and Maryland. The Pennsylvania inpatient discharge data were obtained from the
Pennsylvania Healthcare Cost Containment Council (PHC4), while the Maryland inpatient
21A survey is deemed complete if the patient has valid responses more than half of the questions. In
addition, patients who do not respond to the question that asks about the overall health status are excluded.
22Around 2 percent of the patients cannot be assigned to any service line mainly because they do not have
a valid DRG on the record. However, I do not exclude them from the estimation sample because they can
contribute to the identification of the correlation between self-assessed health status and top-box responses.
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discharge files came from two different sources: the 2009-2012 discharge data were obtained
from the State Inpatient Databases of the Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project at AHRQ
(HCUP SID, 2014);23 and the 2013 data were obtained directly from Maryland HSCRC.
Collectively, these three datasets constitute the universe of inpatient discharges in
the two states during the sample period. They contain information on patient demographics
such as age, gender, race and ethnicity, as well as principle and secondary diagnoses and
procedures performed during the inpatient admission. After excluding patients that are
discharged from ineligible hospitals in Pennsylvania, and those below 18 years of age because
they are not eligible for HCAHPS, the final estimation sample contains 7,050,841 discharges
in 137 Pennsylvania hospitals and 3,030,898 discharges in 47 Maryland hospitals.
My main measure of patient illness severity is a “risk score” computed from the
principle and secondary ICD-9 codes24 reported on the inpatient discharge record. I use the
hierarchical condition categories (HCC) risk adjustment model developed by CMS, which was
first created in 2004 to adjust capitation payment to private health insurers for beneficiaries
enrolled in Medicare Advantage (MA) plans (Pope et al., 2004). One concern is whether the
HCC risk adjustment method is a good measure of patient illness severity in itself. Despite its
relatively low explanatory power and poor performance in predicting expenditures for high-
cost patients (Schone and Brown, 2013),25 it is still one of the state-of-the-art risk adjustment
methods that have been developed so far. Compared to other measures for patient illness
severity commonly used in the literature such as the Charlson comorbidity index (Charlson
et al., 1987) and Elixhauser index (Elixhauser et al., 1998), the HCC risk adjustment model
is considerably more comprehensive and includes more conditions and complications that
23For an overview of HCUP SID, see http://www.hcup-us.ahrq.gov/sidoverview.jsp.
24The Maryland inpatient data report up to 29 secondary ICD-9 codes for each discharge. However, the
Pennsylvania inpatient data only report 8 secondary ICD-9 codes before 2011 (The number was increased
to 17 after 2011). As a result, I only use the first 7 secondary ICD-9 codes across all years for both states
when computing the risk scores to make sure that the changes in the risk scores are not a artifact of how
hospitals document and report patient diagnoses.
25Using Medicare claims and enrollment data, Pope et al. (2011) report that the R2 (the proportion of
variance in Medicare expenditures that is explained by the variables in the model) of CMS HCC V12 model
ranges between 8% and 11%.
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can better capture patient risk.26 Using a sample of Medicare beneficiaries, Li, Kim and
Doshi (2010) find that the HCC model outperforms the Charlson and Elixhauser indexes
in predicting in-hospital and 6-month mortality rates among AMI, congestive heart failure,
diabetes mellitus, and stroke patients. This provides evidence that the HCC model can
be used as a patient risk adjuster (therefore a measure of illness severity) although it was
originally developed to predict cost for Medicare patients.
I use the CMS-HCC Version 12 model to compute the risk scores. Each patient’s
diagnoses are first assigned to condition categories.27 Hierarchies are then imposed so that
a patient is coded for only the most severe manifestation among related diseases. A set of
coefficients (weights) are then applied to each HCC and the interactions among them. In
addition to the diagnostic information, the HCC risk scores also account for patients’ gender,
age, Medicaid eligibility, and disability status.28 Finally, for each patient, the HCC risk score
equals the sum of coefficients across all HCCs (Pope et al., 2011).29 As an alternative measure
of patient illness severity, I use in-hospital mortality. Figure 2.1 contains the trends in in-
hospital mortality and risk scores over time by state. While there is no noticeable differences
in both outcomes between the two states before the HVBP was announced, risk scores in
Pennsylvania hospitals increased at a slightly faster rate than for Maryland hospitals after the
announcement of the HVBP. Table 2.1 contains descriptive statistics of patient demographics
and risk scores by state. In general, patients in Pennsylvania are older and have higher risk
scores.
26For example, the Charlson index only includes 17 conditions (comorbidities) and does not explicitly
account for patient demographics such as age and gender.
27The Maryland inpatient discharge data do not contain an unique patient identifier. As a result, it is
impossible to identify a patient over time. Therefore, a “patient” is technically an inpatient discharge record.
28The inpatient discharge data do not contain information on patients’ Medicaid eligibility or disability
status. Therefore, the HCC risk scores used in this paper do not account for the risk associated with these
two factors.
29See Appendix 2.7.1 for a detailed description of the computation of HCC risk scores.
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2.4 Empirical strategy
In this section I describe the empirical strategies used to test whether the HVBP induces
hospitals to engage in patient risk selection.
2.4.1 Patient illness severity and survey responses
First, I consider the association between patient illness severity and HCAHPS responses.
For each of the experience measures, I estimate the following linear probability model using
exactly the same variables CMS uses in its patient case mix adjustment:
yij = X
′
iβ + δ healthi + εij, (2.1)
where yij is a binary indicator set to 1 if patient i answers the “top-box” response on
questions related to measure j; healthi is patient i’s self-assessed overall health status; Xi
includes controls for patient age (10-year age categories), gender, survey language (a binary
indicator for English), level of education (8th grade or less, some high school but did not
graduate, high school graduate, some college or 2-year degree, 4-year college graduate, more
than 4-year college degree), the type of services received at the hospital (obstetric, surgical,
and medical), and the interactions between service line and a categorical variable for patient
age.30 The parameter of interest is δ, which is the correlation between patient self-assessed
health and “top-box” responses. If δ < 0, then “sicker” patients are less likely to give top-
box responses on HCAHPS.31 If the HCAHPS scores are not risk-adjusted, this negative
correlation will give hospitals an incentive to risk select healthier patients. In theory, perfect
case mix adjustment will eliminate the scope for any patient selection (either negative or
30Following the CMS case mix adjustment formula, I assign patients into 8 age categories: 18-24, 25-34,
35-44, 45-54, 55-64, 65-74, 75-84, and above 85. The service line by age interaction variables are created
as the product of a binary indicator for service line and a single categorical variable ranging from 1 to 8,
corresponding to the each of 8 age categories.
31We use patients’ self-assessed (subjective) health status as a global measure of health given its consistent
and strong association with actual (objective) health status (such as prevalence of diseases and mortality
risk) reported in the epidemiological literature (for example, see Wu et al., 2013; Miilunpalo et al., 1997;
Mossey and Shapiro, 1982).
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positive). However, if conditioning on the variables in equation (2.1) is not sufficient, then
hospital will still have an incentive to identify patients who give more (or less) favorable
responses conditional on variables used in the CMS risk adjustment formula.
To explore this possibility, I further estimate
yij = X
′
iβ + δ healthi + α1 obstetrici × healthi + α2 surgicali × healthi + εij, (2.2)
where obstetrici and surgicali are binary indicators for whether the patient received obstetric
or surgical care at the hospital (the reference group is medical patients).32 The motivation for
doing this is that patients who receive different types of services may have totally different
experience with the hospital. In the methodology study for the current CMS case mix
adjustment model, O’Malley et al. (2005) report a strong relationship between service line
and patients’ rating of the hospital services, and suggest that the case mix adjustment
model should include interactions of each included variable with service if a single model
is to be used for patients across all service lines. If α1 and α2 are statistically different
from 0, then hospitals will have an incentive to risk select patients along a particular service
line. For example, if α1 < 0 (α1 > 0), then conditional on self-assessed health status, sicker
obstetric patients are less (more) likely to give the most positive survey responses, which raise
hospitals’ scores under the HVBP. In other words, the CMS case mix adjustment formula
under-corrects (over-corrects) for the effect of patient severity on top-box responses among
obstetric patients. Hospitals would have an incentive to risk select obstetric patients (the
same argument applies to surgical patients). It should be noted that the actual power of the
selection incentive will depend on the extent to which case mix adjustment changes their
experience scores.
32Patients are assigned to one of these three mutually exclusive service lines (maternity care, medical,
and surgical) based on MS-DRG codes. A detailed list of codes for each service line can be found at
http://www.hcahpsonline.org/Files/MS_DRG_V32_Table.pdf.
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2.4.2 Patient-level analysis
Next, I test the effect of the HVBP on patient illness severity using a difference-in-differences
(DID) strategy. The baseline econometric model is
yijt = α0 PAijt +
3∑
k=1
αk post
k
ijt +
3∑
k=1
δk(PAijt · postkijt) +X ′ijtβ + φj + ξt + εijt, (2.3)
where yijt is a measure of illness severity for patient i discharged from hospital j in year
t, Xijt is a vector of patient characteristics such as age (5-year categories), gender, race
and ethnicity (white, black, Asian, Hispanic, and other race), type of admission (emergent,
urgent, elective, and other type of admission), and type of insurance (private insurance,
Medicare, Medicaid, self-pay, other insurance); and φj and ξt are hospital fixed-effects and
time effects, respectively. I use the binary indicator PAijt to denote patients discharged from
hospitals in Pennsylvania. The performance period for FY 2013 program is July 1, 2011 to
March 31, 2012. For FY 2014 program, the performance period is designated as April 1,
2012 to December 12, 2012. For FY 2015 program, the performance period is January 1,
2013 to December 31, 2013.33 Hospitals began to receive adjusted payments after October
1, 2012, when the FY 2013 HVBP went into effect. Since hospitals’ payment adjustment
factors are determined by the data collected before the program became effective, they might
respond to the HVBP strategically even before they feel real financial impact. To capture
this feature of program implementation, I create 3 mutually exclusive binary indicators that
correspond to the HVBP regime: post1ijt is set to 1 for patients that were discharged between
2011Q3 and 2012Q1 (the performance period for FY 2013 program); post2ijt is set to 1 for
inpatient discharges that occurred between 2012Q2 and 2012Q3 (the performance period for
FY 2014 program);34 post3ijt equals 1 for inpatient discharges occurred after 2012Q4 (the
33See Appendix Table 2.8 for a complete description of baseline and performance periods for HVBP in FY
2013-2015.
34Technically speaking, the performance period for FY 2014 is 2012Q2 to 2012Q4. In order to capture the
effect of actual payment adjustment on hospital behaviors, I assign 2012Q4 to the third phase of HVBP.
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performance period for FY 2015 program/initial post payment period). The coefficients of
interest are δk (k = 1, 2, 3), which are the DID estimates of the effect of the HVBP program
on patient illness severity over time. The rejection of null hypothesis δk = 0 is consistent
with the hypothesis that the implementation of the HVBP caused patient selection.
The validity of the DID strategy hinges on the assumption that the two states would
have had a common trend in patient illness severity in the absence of the HVBP. However,
it is possible that patients in Maryland might not be a perfect comparison group because
Maryland implemented similar quality initiatives earlier in 2008. To address this concern, I
estimate a model of the following specification:
yijt = α0 PAijt+
3∑
k=1
αk post
k
ijt+
3∑
k=1
δk(PAijt·postkijt)+X ′ijtβ+λDt·PAijt+φj+ξt+εijt, (2.4)
which allows the two states to have different pre-HVBP trends. In this specification, Dt is
a single linear trend over the sample period. The estimates of δk are robust to pre-existing
differential trends in outcome yijt.
I estimate both equations (2.3) and (2.4) on HCC risk scores and a binary indicator
of in-hospital mortality using all patients aged 18 or older at the time of admission. To
see whether selection occurs in different service lines, I re-run the models on the samples
of obstetric patients, surgical patients, and medical patients. If the estimates of δk are
statistically significant in any of the subsamples, then it suggests that patient selection
has occurred in that particular patient group (service line). Despite the right-skewness
of the HCC risk scores,35 I report the estimates from models that use raw scale as the
dependent variable due to the fact that transforming the dependent variable in the DID
framework changes the identifying assumption. Specifically, when using logged risk scores as
the dependent variable, identification requires that the trend of risk scores on the log scale
is the same in the absence of the HVBP. Since the risk scores are computed as a weighted
35See Appendix Figure 2.4 for a histogram of these risk scores
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sum across a set of conditions, using the raw scale is more appropriate.36
2.4.3 Hospital-level analysis
In the final component of my empirical analysis, I investigate the effect of the HVBP on
process and experience measures. Since all measures are proportions, they are bounded
between 0 and 1. One can estimate the following transformed model when the dependent
variable is strictly bounded in the unit interval (Papke and Wooldridge, 1996):
Λ−1(yjt) = α1postjt + α2PAjt + δ(PAjt · postjt) + φj + ξt + εjt, (2.5)
where Λ−1(z) = ln z
1−z ; yjt is hospital j’s performance at time t; φj and ξt are hospital fixed-
effects and time effects, respectively. Since only annualized hospital performance data are
available, postjt is set to 1 for 2013 (post payment).
When y can take on values of 0 and 1 with positive probability, the above transfor-
mation fails. But, if the sample size from which the proportion is derived is known, we can
modify (2.5) to account for the mass points at 0 and 1 (Maddala, 1983):
y˜jt = α1postjt + α2PAjt + δ(PAjt · postjt) + φj + ξt + εjt, (2.6)
where
y˜jt = ln
yjt + (2njt)
−1
1− yjt + (2njt)−1 . (2.7)
In (2.7) njt is the sample from which proportion yjt is derived. The parameter of interest δ is
the DID estimate of the effect of the HVBP. In fact, one can just estimate the DID model on
the raw data without transforming the dependent variable. However, ignoring the bounded
nature of proportional dependent variable is problematic. Generally speaking, the validity of
the DID approach hinges on the assumption that the trend in the dependent variable is the
36When I estimate models using logged risk scores as the dependent variable, the results are both quali-
tatively and quantitatively similar.
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same across the treatment and comparison group, regardless of the level of the dependent
variable in the pre-period. This point becomes more subtle when we use proportions as
dependent variables. If initially a proportion differs in level in the treatment and control
group, then an identical change in the underlying variable from which the proportion is
derived can have drastically different effects on the proportion (Mullen, Frank and Rosenthal,
2010). Estimating the effect of the HVBP on the log odds-ratio (Λ−1(·)) can account for this
non-linearity. Since the experience measures are strictly bounded between 0 and 1, I estimate
them on the untransformed model (2.5). In contrast, almost all of the process measures have
a mass point at 1. Therefore, I estimate them on the transformed model (2.6).
2.5 Results
In this section I present the main results from the empirical analysis.
2.5.1 Patient illness severity and HCAHPS survey responses
I report the estimates from equations (2.1) and (2.2) in Appendix Table 2.11. In general,
the estimated coefficient on self-assessed health status is negative and statistically significant
across all experience measures with the exception of discharge information. This is consistent
with the findings from the methodological study of the HCAHPS case mix adjustment: Sicker
patients are less likely to give positive evaluation of health care (O’Malley et al., 2005).
After adding the interaction terms between service line and self-assessed health status, two
interesting findings arise. First, the coefficient on the interaction term health × obstetric
is negative and statistically significant in the regressions on “cleanliness and quietness of
hospital environment” and “overall rating of hospital” (columns 12 and 16 of Table 2.11).
This suggests that relative to medical patients, sicker obstetric patients are less likely to give
top-box responses even after conditioning on self-assessed health status. In other words, the
CMS case mix adjustment formula under-corrects for the tendency of sicker obstetric patients
to give less favorable responses on HCAHPS. Second, for surgical patients, although none
of coefficient estimates of the interaction terms health × surgical are statistically significant
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at 10 percent level, most of them (5 out of 8) are positive. This indicates that the CMS
case mix adjuster may over-corrects for the tendency of sicker surgical patients to give less
favorable responses. Taken together, these results suggest that hospitals in Pennsylvania
have an incentive to avoid sicker obstetric patients and attract sicker surgical patients under
the HVBP.
2.5.2 Patient-level analysis
I estimate equations (2.3) and (2.4) on in-hospital mortality and risk scores using the full
sample of inpatient discharges from Pennsylvania and Maryland as well as three different
subsamples: obstetric patients, surgical patients, and medical patients. Due to the fact that
Maryland implemented similar quality initiatives in 2008, patients discharged from hospitals
in Maryland might not constitute a perfect comparison group. For that reason, my preferred
specification is the model that controls for a linear state-specific trend. For in-hospital
mortality, the estimated coefficients on the interaction terms PA × performance period 1, PA
× performance period 2, and PA × post payment are all negative and statistically significant
in the regression that controls for a single linear trend and its squared (column 1 of Table
2.3) in the full sample. This suggests that after the implementation of the HVBP, patients
in Pennsylvania were less likely to die in the hospital relative to patients in Maryland (a 15
percent decrease relative to the state average in-hospital mortality rate). Under the same
specification, I find a decrease of similar magnitude in the mortality rate among medical
patients (column 7 of Table 2.3). However, no such decrease is found in obstetric patients and
surgical patients. After adding a state-specific linear trend in the model (columns 2, 4, 6 and
8 of Table 2.3), the estimated coefficients on the interaction terms remain significant in the
full sample and the subsample of medical patients (the magnitude of the decreases remains
the same). For obstetric and surgical patients, none of the coefficients on the interaction
terms are statistically significant. Taken together, these results imply that the decrease in
mortality is mostly driven by medical patients. However, we cannot conclude that patient
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illness severity decreased as a result of the HVBP based on the changes in mortality because
an increase in hospitals’ clinical quality can also account for that.
When patient risk scores are the outcome, I do not find any statistically significant
effects in the full sample and subsample of medical patients. However, for obstetric pa-
tients, the estimated coefficient on PA × post payment is negative and statistically significant
(columns 3 of Table 2.4). This indicates that relative to patients in Maryland, the average
illness severity decreased for obstetric patients in Pennsylvania after the HVBP went into ef-
fect (a 53 percent decrease relative to the state mean). In contrast, the estimated coefficient
on PA × post payment is positive and statistically significant for surgical patients, indicating
an increase in average patient illness severity in this case (a 13 percent increase relative to
the state mean). The estimated effects on risk scores are robust to adding a state-specific
linear trend (columns 4 and 6 of Table 2.4). Interestingly, in my preferred specification, the
estimated effects of the HVBP are both positive in the first two performance periods for
obstetric patients while the two effects are both negative for surgical patients. One plausible
explanation is that hospitals in Pennsylvania were first selecting patients based on their prior
beliefs. After they gradually learned how the incompleteness of the CMS case mix adjust-
ment formula could affect patient experience ratings, they began to systematically select
healthier obstetric patients and sicker surgical patients.
2.5.3 Hospital-level analysis
Tables 2.5 and 2.6 report estimates from equations (2.5) and (2.6). For each of the measures,
I estimate models with four different specifications for the time effects. The first two columns
of Tables 2.5 and 2.6 present estimates from regressions that include a single linear trend
and its squared, and the next two columns contain estimates from models that additionally
control for a state-specific linear trend and its squared. For experience measures, all of
the coefficient estimates are positive. Specifically, I find statistically significant increase for
“communication with doctor”, “pain management”, “cleanliness and quietness of hospital
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environment”, and “overall rating” in some of the specifications. In contrast, no effect is
found for any of the process measures. Collectively, these estimates provide evidence that the
HVBP led to an increase in Pennsylvania hospitals’ measured performance on the HCAHPS,
but has no detectable effect on the process of care measures.
2.6 Discussion and conclusion
In this paper, I investigate health care providers’ selection behavior under financial incentives
designed to improve the quality of care. Specifically, I examine how the Hospital Value-Based
Purchasing Program introduced by CMS in mid-2011 affects the mix of patient treated at
participating hospitals using a difference-in-differences strategy. Two findings arise from the
empirical analysis: (1) The patient case mix adjustment formula used by CMS does not
account for interactive effects of patient health status and service line (obstetric, surgical,
and medical) on HCAHPS responses. Relative to medical patients, sicker obstetric (surgical)
patients are less (more) likely to give positive evaluation of their hospital experiences condi-
tional on their self-assessed health status. By implication, CMS over-adjusts (under-adjusts)
the effect of patient health status on the probability of giving the most positive responses for
surgical (obstetric) patients. (2) I also find that hospitals exploited the opportunity to select
patient created by incomplete case mix adjustment, and that the average illness severity
decreased by about 53 percent for obstetric patients and increased by about 13 percent for
surgical patients after the HVBP went into effect. This indicates that hospitals engaged in
patient selection in a way that boosts their performance scores under the HVBP.
Furthermore, I do not find any evidence of improvement in process measures after
the HVBP became effective, but I do find weak evidence that the program was associated
with increases in experience measures. Based on my models of patient illness severity, it is
likely that at least part of this increase can be attributed to patient selection.
This study is subject to several limitations. First, the evolving nature of the HVBP
poses significant difficulty in studying its effect. Overtime CMS has added several new
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measures to the HVBP to capture more aspects of hospital care. This means hospital
responses to the HVBP will also evolve over time. For example, after adding outcome-based
measures such as 30-day mortality rate for AMI, heart failure, and pneumonia patients,
hospitals face a new selection incentive, depending on how well risk adjustment works for
these measures. Therefore, it is not possible to fully isolate and quantify the extent of patient
selection due to patient experience measures. If selection incentives for outcome measures
work in the same direction as those for patient experience measures, then the estimated
effect on changes in patient illness severity cannot be entirely attributed to the experience
measures. Nonetheless, over the time period I examine, I find no effect of the HVBP on
process measures.
A second limitation is that the analysis on the inpatient discharge data is at the
“visit-level” instead of the patient-level. Ideally, the risk of a patient (illness severity) should
be measured using information before the actual hospital admission (index admission) oc-
curs.37 The main reason for doing this is that most of the time the actual “patient selection”
process effectively occurs before patients are admitted. Unfortunately, the Maryland inpa-
tient discharge data do not contain a unique patient identifier, which makes it impossible
to identify individual patients over time. As a result, the HCC risk scores are computed
using contemporaneous diagnoses in both states. The main concern with this approach is
the HCC risk scores may not fully capture patient illness severity if discharge records do
not contain ICD-9 codes of all pre-existing conditions. However, under the current Medicare
DRG system, hospitals have an incentive to code all pre-existing conditions because this can
potentially lead to higher reimbursement. For that reason, using contemporaneous diagnosis
codes to determine patient illness severity should be less of a concern.
Another limitation of this paper is that there are a number of other CMS initiatives
that are concurrent with the HVBP, which could also result in patient selection. Among these
new efforts, the most notable two programs are the the Hospital Readmissions Reduction
37A common measure of patient illness severity used in the literature is medical expenditure (based on
payments) in the year prior to the index admission. For example, see Dranove et al. (2003).
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Program (HRRP) and the Hospital-acquired Condition Reduction Program (HAC). The
HRRP became effective on October 1, 2012, the same day as the HVBP. Under the program,
hospitals with excess 30-day readmission rates for AMI, heart failure, and pneumonia patients
are penalized by up to 1 percent of the base DRG payment.38 This raises the concern that
the main results in the paper could be mainly driven by the HRRP instead of the HVBP. In
order to mitigate this concern, I estimated visit-level models using the subsamples of AMI,
heart failure, and pneumonia patients. I do not find changes in mortality or HCC risk scores
among these patients.39 The HAC, on the other hand, will not become effective until FY
2015 (beginning October 1, 2014).40 Since the data collection period for FY 2015 HAC ends
on December 31, 2013, it is possible that the HAC affected hospitals’ selection behavior prior
to the time period corresponding to payment determination. However, the HAC payment
reduction only affects hospitals that rank among the lowest-performing quartile in HAC
measures. Therefore, the effect of the HAC on the results in this paper is limited.
Despite these limitations, the findings in this paper have important policy implica-
tions. Accurate case mix adjustment methods are critical when implementing large-scale
public P4P initiatives like the HVBP, HRRP, and HAC to avoid unintended consequences
like patient risk selection. Since patient mix varies widely among different types of hospitals
in the U.S, hospitals treating certain types of patient populations will be unfairly penalized
if their performance scores are not properly adjusted for the differences in patient charac-
teristics. The results in this paper provide evidence that hospitals do strategically respond
to the selection incentives created by insufficient risk adjustment. If safety net hospitals
that operate in low-income areas consistently under-perform mainly due to the character-
38For FY 2015 HRRP, CMS added 30-day readmission rate for (1) patients admitted for an acute exac-
erbation of chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD); and (2) patients admitted for elective total hip
arthroplasty (THA) and total knee arthroplasty (TKA). Also, the amount of penalty can be as much as 3
percent of the base DRG payment in FY 2015.
39These results are not shown, but are available from the author upon request.
40The HAC uses AHRQ Patient Safety Indicators (PSI) and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
National Healthcare Safety Network (CDC NHSN) measures. The performance period for AHRQ PSIs is
July 1, 2011 to June 30, 2013, and the performance period for CDC NHSN measures is January 1, 2012 to
December 31, 2013.
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istics of the patient they treat, they may avoid certain types of patients that are likely to
lower their performance scores, which could in turn widen the disparities in access to care
for vulnerable populations. Thus, without evidence showing the improvement of the quality
of care, P4P programs like the HVBP might end up welfare-reducing from a social stand-
point. To minimize the risk of unintended consequences in public P4P programs, policy
makers should consider carefully when selecting new measures in the HVBP and develop
more comprehensive risk adjustment methods for existing measures.
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Tables
Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics: inpatient discharge data
PA (N =7,050,841) MD (N =3,030,898)
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Patient characteristics
Age 18-24 0.057 0.232 0.065 0.247
Age 25-29 0.053 0.223 0.064 0.244
Age 30-34 0.053 0.223 0.065 0.246
Age 35-39 0.042 0.201 0.054 0.225
Age 40-44 0.045 0.208 0.057 0.231
Age 45-49 0.058 0.233 0.071 0.256
Age 50-54 0.072 0.259 0.082 0.274
Age 55-59 0.078 0.269 0.082 0.274
Age 60-64 0.083 0.275 0.082 0.274
Age 65-69 0.083 0.277 0.079 0.270
Age 70-74 0.081 0.273 0.073 0.260
Age 75-79 0.085 0.279 0.070 0.256
Age 80-84 0.091 0.287 0.069 0.253
Age 85-89 0.074 0.262 0.055 0.229
Age 90-100 0.045 0.207 0.034 0.181
Female 0.582 0.493 0.593 0.491
White 0.810 0.392 0.583 0.493
Black 0.130 0.336 0.330 0.470
Asian 0.007 0.085 0.018 0.133
Other race 0.052 0.223 0.069 0.254
Hispanic 0.025 0.157 0.033 0.178
Admission type-emergency 0.571 0.495 0.666 0.472
Admission type-urgent 0.170 0.376 0.127 0.332
Admission type-elective 0.253 0.435 0.167 0.373
Admission type-other 0.006 0.077 0.041 0.198
Insurance-private 0.309 0.462 0.319 0.466
Insurance-selfpay 0.020 0.140 0.055 0.229
Insuracne-Medicare 0.507 0.500 0.430 0.495
Insurance-Medicaid 0.151 0.358 0.167 0.373
Insurance-other 0.013 0.113 0.028 0.164
Year 2009 0.209 0.407 0.216 0.411
Year 2010 0.205 0.403 0.209 0.407
Year 2011 0.202 0.402 0.201 0.401
Year 2012 0.195 0.396 0.188 0.391
Year 2013 0.189 0.391 0.186 0.389
Performance period 1 (0/1) 0.149 0.357 0.147 0.354
Performance period 2 (0/1) 0.097 0.296 0.094 0.292
31
Post payment (0/1) 0.237 0.425 0.232 0.422
Patient outcomes
HCC risk score 1.124 0.884 1.106 0.895
In-hospital mortality 0.020 0.142 0.020 0.141
Notes: *HCC risk scores are based on 3,030,611 inpatient discharges for Maryland
and 7,049,364 inpatient discharges for Pennsylvania with valid and non-missing
ICD-9-CM codes.
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Table 2.5: Estimates from difference-in-differences models: HCAHPS expe-
rience of care measures
Measures (1) (2) (3) (4)
Communication with nurses 0.022 0.022 0.032 0.007
(0.022) (0.022) (0.028) (0.044)
Communication with doctor 0.036** 0.036** 0.022 0.037
(0.018) (0.018) (0.025) (0.045)
Responsiveness of staff 0.006 0.006 0.002 -0.002
(0.018) (0.018) (0.026) (0.045)
Pain management 0.044* 0.044* 0.037 0.021
(0.024) (0.024) (0.031) (0.050)
Cleanliness and quietness 0.035 0.035 0.067** 0.126***
(0.021) (0.021) (0.028) (0.042)
Communication about medicines 0.032 0.032 0.032 0.019
(0.022) (0.022) (0.031) (0.049)
Discharge information 0.020 0.020 0.036 0.064
(0.031) (0.031) (0.036) (0.062)
Overall rating 0.036 0.036 0.075** 0.050
(0.028) (0.028) (0.035) (0.051)
Linear trend X X X X
Linear trend sq X X X
State-specific linear trend X X
State-specific linear trend sq X
Hospital fixed-effects X X X X
Notes: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Standard errors are clustered at
hospital level. Each cell represents a model.
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Table 2.6: Estimates from difference-in-differences models: process
of care measures
Measures (1) (2) (3) (4)
HF-1 0.051 0.051 -0.106 -0.045
(0.209) (0.209) (0.238) (0.296)
Pn-3b -0.110 -0.110 0.147 0.547
(0.181) (0.181) (0.245) (0.333)
Pn-6 -0.189 -0.189 -0.001 0.229
(0.127) (0.127) (0.169) (0.313)
SCIP-Card-2 -0.007 -0.007 -0.021 -0.007
(0.200) (0.200) (0.204) (0.255)
SCIP-VTE-2 -0.215 -0.215 -0.280 -0.257
(0.190) (0.190) (0.219) (0.274)
SCIP-Inf-1 -0.162 -0.162 -0.319 -0.381
(0.203) (0.204) (0.204) (0.257)
SCIP-Inf-2 0.155 0.155 -0.194 -0.379
(0.189) (0.189) (0.245) (0.317)
SCIP-Inf-3 -0.221 -0.221 -0.213 -0.203
(0.166) (0.166) (0.187) (0.240)
Linear trend X X X X
Linear trend sq X X X
State-specific linear trend X X
State-specific linear trend sq X
Hospital fixed-effects X X X X
Notes:***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Standard errors are clustered
at hospital level. Each cell represents a model.
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Figures
Figure 2.1: Trend in health outcomes
(a) In-hospital mortality
(b) HCC risk scores
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2.7 Appendix
2.7.1 Constructions of HCC risk scores
I utilize the CMS HCC Version 12 Model to compute the HCC risk scores. The algorithm
I use is based on the SAS programs CMS provides on its website.41 In addition to the
demographic (mainly age and gender) and diagnostic information, the HCC model also
utilizes information on patients’ Medicaid eligibility and disability status. Since the inpatient
discharge data I use lack these variables, the risk scores used in this paper do not account
for these factors.
In constructing the risk scores, I first assign each patient to 70 HCCs based on the
principle and up to 7 secondary ICD-9 codes using a HCC-ICD-9 crosswalk. Note that a
patient can be categorized into more than one HCCs if he has multiple comorbidities. For
example, a patient can both have congestive heart failure (HCC 80) and pneumonia (HCC
112). Therefore, the risk score for this patient reflects both conditions. Hierarchies are
then applied to the condition categories to make sure that only the most severe form of
a condition is coded and a type of co-morbidity is not counted more than once for each
patient. For example, if a patient is initially coded to have AMI (HCC 81), then he will be
coded as not having “unstable angina and other acute ischemic heart disease” (HCC 82) and
“angina pectoris/old myocardial infarction” (HCC 83) because HCC 81 represents the most
severe form of the heart condition among the three. In addition to diagnoses, patients are
categorized into a number of age-gender cells, each of which is associated with a coefficient
that represents patient risk in that cell. As a last step, a patient’s risk score is computed as
Risk score =
∑
i
HCCi × αi + λ,
where HCCi is a binary indicator that equals 1 if the patient has a condition in HCCi, with
41These SAS programs are available at http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Health-Plans/
MedicareAdvtgSpecRateStats/Risk-Adjustors.html.
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αi being the coefficient (weight) for that condition category. The constant term λ is the risk-
adjustment factor for the particular age-gender cell the patient belongs to. In computing the
risk scores, I use the coefficients from the CMS HCC-Community Model, which are based on
expenditures of Medicare enrollees residing in communities.42
2.7.2 CMS patient case mix adjustment for HCAHPS
I briefly describe the method CMS uses for patient case mix adjustment in this section. For
a detailed description of case mix adjustment methodology for HCAHPS, please refer to
O’Malley et al. (2005). The purpose of case-mix adjustment is to counter the tendency of
patients to respond more positively and negatively (for example, a patient in fair health is
less likely to answer the top-box responses than a patient in excellent health). It is performed
quarterly after data cleaning and before mode adjustment. Currently, CMS uses 15 case-mix
adjustment factors, including self-assessed health status, level of education, age, service line,
patient response percentile, interactions between age and service line, and survey language.
Hospitals’ HCAHPS scores are adjusted to quarterly national means of these adjustment
factors. For a hospital, the patient case-mix adjusted score on a given measure is computed
using the following formula:
y˜j = yj +
∑
i
αij(mi − δi),
where yj is the unadjusted raw score on measure j, αij is the coefficient of adjustment factor
i along measure j, and δi is the national mean of adjustment factor i. The formula shows
clearly that the direction of adjustment for a particular measure is determined by both
coefficients of adjustment factors and hospitals’ patient case mix relative to the national
average.43
42Currently, there are 4 different versions of the CMS HCC risk-adjustment models, each being applicable
for different populations. Other versions include Institutional Model, New Enrollee Model, and Special Need
Model.
43For an example of case mix adjustment coefficients, see http://www.hcahpsonline.org/
modeadjustment.aspx.
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Table 2.7: Domain weights for HVBP: FY 2013 - FY 2015
Domain FY 2013 Weight FY 2014 Weight FY 2015 Weight
Clinical process of care 70% 45% 20%
Patient experience of care 30% 30% 30%
Outcome of care N/A 25% 30%
Efficiency of care N/A N/A 20%
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Figure 2.4: Distribution of HCC risk scores
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2.7.3 HCAHPS survey instrument
Your care from nurses
1. During this hospital stay, how often did nurses treat you with courtesy and respect?
1. Never
2. Sometimes
3. Usually
4. Always
2. During this hospital stay, how often did nurses listen carefully to you?
1. Never
2. Sometimes
3. Usually
4. Always
3. During this hospital stay, how often did nurses explain things in a way you could
understand?
1. Never
2. Sometimes
3. Usually
4. Always
4. During this hospital stay, after you pressed the call button, how often did you get help
as soon as you wanted it?
1. Never
2. Sometimes
3. Usually
4. Always
Your care from doctors
5. During this hospital stay, how often did doctors treat you with courtesy and respect?
1. Never
2. Sometimes
3. Usually
4. Always
6. During this hospital stay, how often did doctors listen carefully to you?
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1. Never
2. Sometimes
3. Usually
4. Always
7. During this hospital stay, how often did doctors explain things in a way you could
understand?
1. Never
2. Sometimes
3. Usually
4. Always
The hospital environment
8. During this hospital stay, how often were your room and bathroom kept clean?
1. Never
2. Sometimes
3. Usually
4. Always
9. During this hospital stay, how often was the area around your room quiet at night?
1. Never
2. Sometimes
3. Usually
4. Always
Your experiences in the hospital
10. During this hospital stay, did you need help from nurses or other hospital staff in
getting to the bathroom or in using a bedpan?
1. Yes
2. No
11. How often did you get help in getting to the bathroom or in using a bedpan as soon
as you wanted.
1. Never
2. Sometimes
3. Usually
4. Always
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12. During this hospital stay, did you need medicine for pain?
1. Yes
2. No
13. During this hospital stay, how often was your pain well controlled?
1. Never
2. Sometimes
3. Usually
4. Always
14. During this hospital stay, how often did hospital staff do everything they could to help
you with your pain?
1. Never
2. Sometimes
3. Usually
4. Always
15. During this hospital stay, were you given any medicine that you had not taken before?
1. Yes
2. No
16. Before giving you any new medicine, how often did hospital staff tell you what the
medicine was for?
1. Never
2. Sometimes
3. Usually
4. Always
17. Before giving you any new medicine, how often did hospital staff describe possible side
effects in a way you could understand?
1. Never
2. Sometimes
3. Usually
4. Always
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When you left the hospital
18. After you left the hospital, did you go directly to your own home, to someone else’s
home, or to another health facility?
1. Own home
2. Someone else’s home
3. Another health facility
19. During this hospital stay, did doctors, nurses, or other hospital staff talk with you
about whether you would have the help you needed when you left the hospital?
20. Before giving you any new medicine, how often did hospital staff describe possible side
effects in a way you could understand?
1. Yes
2. No
21. During this hospital stay, did you get information in writing about what symptoms or
health problems to look out for after you left the hospital?
1. Yes
2. No
Overall rating of hospital
22. Using any number from 0 to 10, when 0 is the worst hospital possible and 10 is the
best hospital possible, what number would you use to rate this hospital during your
stay?
23. Would you recommend this hospital to your friends and family?
1. Definitely no
2. Probably no
3. Probably yes
4. Definitely yes
Understanding you care when you left the hospital
24. During this hospital stay, staff took my preferences and those of my family or caregiver
into account in deciding what my health care need would be when I left.
1. Strongly disagree
2. Disagree
3. Agree
4. Strongly agree
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25. When I left the hospital, I had a good understanding of the things I was responsible
for in managing my health.
1. Strongly disagree
2. Disagree
3. Agree
4. Strongly agree
26. When I left the hospital, I clearly understood the purpose for taking each of my med-
ications.
1. Strongly disagree
2. Disagree
3. Agree
4. Strongly agree
5. I was not given any medication when I left the hospital
About you
27. During this hospital stay, were you admitted to this hospital through the Emergency
Room?
1. Yes
2. No
28. In general, how would you rate your overall health?
1. Excellent
2. Very good
3. Good
4. Fair
5. Poor
29. In general, how would you rate your overall mental or emotional health?
1. Excellent
2. Very good
3. Good
4. Fair
5. Poor
30. What is the highest grade of school that you have completed?
1. 8th grade or less
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2. Some high school, but did not graduate
3. High school graduate or GED
4. Some college or 2-year degree
5. 4-year college graduate
6. More than 4-year college degree
31. Are you of Spanish, Hispanic or Latino origin or descent?
1. No, not Spanish/Hispanic/Latino
2. Yes, Puerto Rican
3. Yes, Mexican, Mexican American, Chicano
4. Yes, Cuban
5. Yes, other Spanish/Hispanic/Latino
32. What is your race? Please choose one or more.
1. White
2. Black or African American
3. Asian
4. Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander
5. American Indian or Alaska Native
33. What language do you mainly speak at home?
1. English
2. Spanish
3. Chinese
4. Russian
5. Vietnamese
6. Portuguese
7. Some other language (please print):
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Chapter 3
The Short-Term Effect of Depression
on Labor Market Outcomes
3.1 Introduction
Mental health problems are prevalent among U.S. adults. It is estimated that about 26
percent of adults have some type of mental disorder broadly defined, and 6 percent suffer
from severe mental illness (Kessler et al, 2005). The costs associated with mental illness
include direct medical costs for mental health treatment and indirect costs in the form of
time away from work (absenteeism) and reduced productivity while at work (presenteeism).
The National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) estimated that the total annual cost for
people with severely debilitating mental disorders exceeds $300 billion each year, a large
fraction of which falls on payers of medical services and employers (NIMH, 2002).
Among various mental health conditions, depression is of interest for two reasons.
First, it is one of the most common mental health problems among adults. In 2011, 6.6
percent of adults aged 18 or older in the U.S. (15.2 million people) experienced at least one
major depressive episode during the past year (National Survey on Drug Use and Health,
2011). Second, the social cost of depression is surprisingly high: in high-income countries,
unipolar depression (also known as major depressive disorder or major depression) is the
leading cause of burden of disease and accounts for 8.2 percent of total disability-adjusted
life years (DALYs). In contrast, heart diseases only account for 6.3 percent of total DALYs
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(WHO, 2008).
A correct understanding of the economic costs associated with mental health problems
has important policy implications. Historically, mental health conditions are covered less gen-
erously than physical illness by private insurance, which has contributed to under-treatment
of mental health problems.1 Legislators at both the federal and state level responded by
enacting mental health parity laws that aim to expand coverage for mental health condi-
tions. However, it is still unclear whether these parity laws influence health outcomes (GAO,
2011), and if mental health conditions do not significantly affect individuals labor market
opportunities, the benefits of expanding mental health coverage may not justify the costs.
The main difficulty in attributing poor labor market outcomes to the presence of
mental health problems in a cross section of individuals is endogeneity. As pointed out by
Chatterji et al (2011), mental health status is endogenous in both a structural and statistical
sense: reverse causality poses a threat to identification if mental health and labor market
outcomes are determined simultaneously. For example, job loss could trigger an episode
of depression for an individual with a predisposition. In addition, unobserved physical and
mental health status as well as unobserved productivity may lead to omitted variable bias. In
most cases, this type of endogeneity will lead to an over-estimation of the negative impact of
poor mental health on labor market outcomes, such as employment, wages, work hours and
work loss days, in non-causal analyses.2 To address this endogeneity problem, researchers
have primarily relied on instrumental variables or exclusion restrictions in multiple equation
models (Ettner et al, 1997; Chatterji et al, 2011; Alexandre and French, 2001). Nonetheless,
it is difficult to find valid instruments that affect mental health but have no impact on
labor market outcomes. The instruments that have been used in the literature fall into two
broad categories: personal characteristics and social support.3 However, the exogeneity of
1According to the National Survey on Drug Use and Health in 2007, among the 24.3 million adults with
serious psychological distress, only 44.6 percent used mental health services in the past year.
2It is possible that certain types omitted variables could result in the under-estimation of the impact of
poor mental health for some outcomes. For example, unobserved generosity in mental health coverage could
bias the effect of poor mental health towards zero in a wage equation.
3See Chatterji et al (2007) for a comprehensive review of the instruments that have been used in the
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these instruments is difficult to validate. For example, the same personal characteristics that
affect mental health may be correlated with productivity and labor market outcomes, and
greater support from families or communities may also be related to better labor market
opportunities.
We exploited the longitudinal dimension of the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey
(MEPS) to estimate the causal relationship between depression and labor market outcomes.
The MEPS is well suited to this analysis because it contains a clinically validated measure
of depression that is collected contemporaneously with several labor market outcomes. We
estimated fixed effects and correlated random effects (CRE) models (Chamberlain, 1980),
which require no exclusion restrictions for identification and allow unobserved heterogeneity
to be correlated with the regressors. This is an attractive alternative method of measuring
causal effects when the primary threats to causal inference are unobservable dimensions of
productivity and health status.
3.2 Theoretical framework and empirical methods
3.2.1 A simple theoretical model of labor supply
We follow the standard labor supply model with health capital (Currie and Madrian, 1999).
The inter-temporal utility function for individual i is
Ui =
T∑
t=1
(
1
1 + δ
)t
Uit, (3.1)
where δ is a constant discount rate. We further assumed that the utility in period t takes
the form:
Uit = U1(Cit) + U2(Hit, Lit), (3.2)
where Cit is a composite commodity with price normalized to one, Hit is the current health
capital, and Lit is the leisure consumed by the individual in that period. The individual
literature.
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maximizes his overall utility subject to the following constraints:
Hit = H(Hi,t−1, Vit, µi),
Qitωit + Ait = Cit,
Lit + Vit +Qit + Sit = Ω,
ωit = ω(Hit, Xit,Mit,mi),
Sit = S(Hit, Zit, θi).
(3.3)
The first constraint is the health production function where current health capital, Hit, de-
pends on past health capital as well as time spent in health production, Vit. µi is unobserved
heterogeneity in health production. The second and third constraints are a budget and time
constraint, respectively. The budget constraint limits expenditure on the composite com-
modity to no more than the sum of unearned income Ait and labor income Qitωit, while the
time constraint ensures that the sum of sick time, Sit , hours worked, Qit , time devoted to
health production, Vit, and leisure, Lit, equal total time available (Ω). The fourth constraint
specifies the wage is a function of health capital, a vector of individual characteristics, Xit,
observed job and employer characteristics, Mit, and unobserved productivity, mi. In the
last constraint, sick time Sit is a function of current health capital, a vector of exogenous
determinants, Zit, individual-specific propensity to get sick, θi. The individual chooses the
optimal consumption path, Cit, hours worked, Qit ≥ 0, time inputs into health production,
Vit ≥ 0, to maximize his lifetime utility subject to (3.3). The first-order conditions with
respect to Qit are given by
∂U2
∂Lit
≥ (1 + δ)tωitλit, t = 1, . . . , T, (3.4)
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where λit is the marginal utility of wealth in period t. It follows that the conditional labor
supply function in period t is
Qit = Q
(
λit, (1 + δ)
t, Hit, ω (Hit, Xit,Mit,mi)
)
. (3.5)
One of the distinct features of this model is that the health stock is an endogenous choice.
Individuals can affect the health stock by altering time devoted to health production. From
the quasi-reduced form equation of labor supply as a function of health, it is clear that
there are several determinants of labor supply that are unobserved to the econometrician.
Some of these, such as unobserved determinants of sickness and health production, and
unmeasured productivity have a large genetic component, while unobserved preferences may
be established prior to adulthood. Under these assumptions, one can further decompose all
the unobserved factors into time-invariant and time-varying components. Denote αi and εit
as all the time-invariant and time-varying determinants of labor supply, respectively, where
αi = µi +mi. Equation (3.5) then becomes:
Qit = Q(Xit, Hit,Mit, αi, εit) (3.6)
which serves as the basis of our empirical analysis.
3.2.2 Empirical models
One basic estimating equation for (3.6) is:
Yit = f(X
′
itβ +Ditγ + αi + εit), (3.7)
where Yit is the labor market outcome of interest for individual i in time period t, Xit is
a vector of covariates including demographics, human capital, and observed physical health
status. We use the binary indicator Dit to denote whether the individual is depressed in
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time period t. The time-invariant parameter αi captures unobserved components of physical
and mental health status and unmeasured productivity. The error term εit is assumed to be
uncorrelated with all regressors from all time periods (strong exogeneity). The choice of f(·)
is dependent on the outcome Yit. For employment status, we specify (3.7) as
Pr(Yit = 1) = Φ(X
′
itβ +Ditγ + αi), (3.8)
where Φ(·) is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. In the case of continuous
outcomes such as hourly wage and weekly hours worked, (3.7) is the identity function.
Because hourly wage is highly skewed to the right, we used the log transformation of the
hourly wage as the dependent variable. In addition, we estimated a set of ordered probit
models using the conditional sample to investigate whether depression affects full-time versus
part-time work status. We created three categories of weekly hours worked: less than 30
hours a week, between 30 and 40 hours a week, and at least 40 hours a week (full-time). The
reason why we made a distinction between those who work part-time for 30 or more hours
per week is that some employers offer fringe benefits (such as health insurance) to those who
work at least 30 hours a week.4
We are also interested in absenteeism, which is captured in the MEPS using a count
variable indicating the number work loss days during the reference period. We modeled
work loss days using the zero-inflated ordered probit (ZIOP) specification developed by
Harris and Zhao (2007). This model is more appropriate than a standard count data model
for two reasons. First, the distribution of work loss days is highly skewed, with over 70
percent of employed individuals reporting zero work loss days and only around 10 percent
reporting more than 7 annual work loss days. The ZIOP specification allowed us to account
for this right skewness by combining work loss days at the higher end of its distribution into
discrete categories (Meyerhoefer and Zuvekas, 2010). Second, the ZIOP model facilitates
4According to the data from National Compensation Survey, 24 percent of the part-time workers in
private industry have access to medical care benefits (Employee Benefits in the United States- March 2012).
URL: http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/ebs2_07272010.pdf
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the investigation of the effect of depression at both the extensive and intensive margins by
separately modeling two different latent processes that generate the zero counts of work loss
days. In particular, zero counts were reported because individuals remained healthy during
the sample period, or because they did get sick, but remained at work while they were ill
(i.e. presenteeism).
Let r˜ be a latent variable underlying the first data generating process determining
sickness:
r˜it = X
′
1itβ +Ditγ + αi + ηit. (3.9)
The individual is healthy if r˜ ≤ 0, but when the individual becomes sick r˜ > 0. If the error
term ηit follows a standard normal distribution, then the probability of sickness is
Pr(rit = 1|X1it, Dit) = Pr(r˜it > 0|X1it, Dit) = Φ(X ′1itβ +Ditγ + αi). (3.10)
Conditional on illness, the actual work loss days of each individual is a discrete variable
(y˜ = 0, 1, . . . , J), which is assumed to be determined by the latent process:
y˜∗ = X ′2itpi +Ditϕ+ αi + νit, (3.11)
where y˜ = j when cj < y˜
∗
it < cj+1 (j = 0, 1, . . . , J), which are cutoffs estimated jointly with
(β′, γ, pi′, ϕ)′, and νit is standard normally distributed. Therefore, presenteeism occurs when
y˜ = j = 0. For notational simplicity, we suppress individual and time subscripts as well as
unobserved heterogeneity, and denote X˜1 = (X
′
1, D)
′ and X˜2 = (X ′2, D)
′. Then the two
latent processes map to the observed data as y = ry˜, such that the density of y is given by
Pr(y) =

Pr(y = 0|X˜1, X˜2) =
[
1− Φ(X˜ ′1β˜)
]
+ Φ(X˜ ′1β˜)Φ(−X˜ ′2p˜i),
Pr(y = j|X˜1, X˜2) = Φ(X˜ ′1β˜)
[
Φ(cj+1 − X˜ ′2p˜i)− Φ(cj − X˜ ′2p˜i)
]
,
Pr(y = J |X˜1, X˜2) = Φ(X˜ ′1β˜)
[
1− Φ(cJ − X˜ ′2p˜i)
]
,
(3.12)
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where j = 1, · · · , J − 1. We estimated this model using the conditional sample of workers
and computed an overall marginal effect of depression on work loss days as
ME =
∑
i
MEi × Li, (3.13)
where L is the weighted average of work loss days in each category, and MEi is the marginal
effect of depression on the probability of being in category i.
Although one could in principle model αi using fixed effects, this estimation strategy
does not yield consistent parameter estimates of most nonlinear specifications when the
time series dimension of the panel is fixed (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). As an alternative
Chamberlain (1980) proposed a random effects estimator that is consistent when T is fixed
and allows αi to be correlated with all regressors in all time periods. Again, denote X˜ =
(X ′, D)′ and β˜ = (β′, γ)′, and note that αi can be modeled using a linear projection containing
the regressors from all time periods:
αi = X˜
′
i1λ1 + X˜
′
i2λ2 + · · ·+ X˜ ′iTλT + ui, (3.14)
where ui is orthogonal to X˜ by construction, and is assumed to be distributed as N(0, σ
2
u).
Substituting (3.14) into (3.7), we have
Yit = f(X˜
′
i1λ1 + · · ·+ X˜ ′it(β˜ + λt) + · · ·+ X˜ ′iTλT + ui + εit). (3.15)
Jakubson (1988) described a two-step procedure for consistent estimation of β˜ in labor
supply models. First, consistent estimates of the reduced-form parameters are obtained
from equation-by-equation estimation of (3.15), followed by identification of the structural
parameters β˜, through minimum distance estimation:
minD(ψ) = (pˆi −Hψ)′Ωˆ−1(pˆi −Hψ), (3.16)
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where ψ denotes the vector of structural parameters, pˆiis the vector of reduced-form parame-
ters obtained from the first step, Ωˆ is the variance-covariance matrix of pˆi, and H is a design
matrix that maps the structural parameters to the reduced-form parameters. Where possi-
ble we confirmed the estimates of our nonlinear CRE models with linear models containing
individual fixed effects.
3.3 Data
To estimate our empirical models we used the 2004-2009 Medical Expenditure Panel Sur-
vey (MEPS), subset to individuals aged 18-64 who were not full-time students. The MEPS
is a nationally representative overlapping panel survey designed to provide estimates of
health care use, expenditures, and health insurance coverage for the U.S. civilian non-
institutionalized population. The MEPS contains detailed information on respondents health
status, demographic and socio-economic characteristics, and employment information. Each
panel of respondents was interviewed in 5 rounds covering 2 calendar years.
Our indicator variable for major depression was calculated using the Patient Health
Questionnaire (PHQ-2) index, collected during MEPS interview rounds 2 and 4. The PHQ-2
is a validated screening tool for depressive disorders (Kroenke et al, 2003) that is derived from
two questions that ask whether the respondent was bothered by ”having little interest or
pleasure in doing things” and whether he was ”feeling down, depressed and hopeless” during
the past two weeks. For each question, respondents rate themselves on scale of 0-3 based
on the frequency of depressed mood and decreased interest in usual activities. The PHQ-2
index is the sum of scores from the above two items and ranges from 0-6. As suggested by
Kroenke et al (2003), we coded individuals as suffering from major depression if the value of
the PHQ-2 index was greater or equal to 3.5 Some respondents had missing values for the
5Based on this screening tool, 9.1 percent of the individuals in the 2004-2009 MEPS suffered from major
depression. Kessler et al. (2005) report that the 12-month prevalence rate of major depressive disorder was
6.7 percent between 2001-2003 based on the DSM diagnostic criteria in the National Comorbidity Survey
Replication. Our prevalence rate is higher because the PHQ-2 also captures short-term depressive symptoms.
In particular, Kroenke et al (2003) found that PHQ-2 3 had a sensitivity of 83% and a specificity of 92% for
major depression.
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PHQ-2 index either because they were ineligible for the Self-Administrated Questionnaire
(SAQ) containing the PHQ-2 questions, or they did not respond to the SAQ.6 We excluded
individuals ineligible for the SAQ from our estimation sample, and for those where were
eligible but did not respond, we imputed a PHQ-2 index value using a generalized linear
model.7
Respondents were asked to report on labor market outcomes in all 5 rounds, but
since the SAQ is only administrated in rounds 2 and 4 (in the middle of the each year), we
used the outcome variables collected during these same rounds. We considered individuals
with a current main job on the interview date as employed, but excluded the self-employed
from our estimation sample because the MEPS does not contain their wage information.8
We converted hourly wage data and all monetary measures of productivity costs to constant
2009 dollars using the urban CPI.
The MEPS question designed to measure workplace productivity loss asks respondents
”the number of times the person lost half-day or more from work because of illness, injury,
mental or emotional problems” during the interview round. We constructed work loss days
assuming that respondents lost a full day of work. While we believe this to be the most
likely duration of work loss, it means that our estimates represent the upper bound of the
effect of depression on absenteeism. However, when we computed aggregate productivity
loss estimates from the work loss day models, we did so assuming only half a day was lost
to identify the lower bound, and a full day was lost to identify the upper bound estimate.
6All adults above 18 as of the interview date were asked to fill out the SAQ, with the exception of those
made ineligible because they were deceased, institutionalized, moved out of the U.S, or moved to military
facilities.
7We used a GLM with a log link to account for the right skewness of the distribution of the PHQ-2
index. In the imputation regressions, we included socio-demographic characteristics, the Physical Component
Summary (PCS) scores, and Mental Component Summary (MCS) scores. Both PCS and MCS scores were
calculated based on the questions in SF-12 Health Survey. The correlation between MCS score and the
PHQ-2 index is quite high (the correlation coefficient is -0.72, with the negative sign the result of opposite
scaling on the MCS).
8Employed individuals who had missing hours or wage were dropped from the conditional sample. Those
who reported working more than 120 hours per week were also excluded due to concerns over reporting error.
When estimating the aggregate cost of worker absenteeism due to depression we imputed the wages of the
self-employed and included them in our calculations.
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Due to the fact that the length of reference period varies across respondents, we normalized
work loss days to a 12-month period.
We controlled for a full set of socio-demographic and employment characteristics
in our models. Our main control variables include age and its square, gender, race and
ethnicity, marital status, region (Northeast, South, Midwest, West), urban residence, years
of education completed before entering the survey, union status, employer size (less than 25
employees, between 25-99 employees, between 100-500 employees, more than 500 employees),
benefits provided by the employer (sick pay, retirement plan, and paid vacations), occupation
and industry indicators,9 number of children under 5 or 18 in the household, log of income
earned by other family members (normalized by household size), and year dummies. In order
to control for physical health status, we included the Physical Component Summary (PCS)
score, which is derived from the questions in SF-12 Health Survey contained in the SAQ.
Higher values of the PCS score indicate better physical health status. In the regressions
where the dependent variable is weekly hours worked, we also included the log of hourly
wages as a control to ensure our specification is consistent with the standard labor supply
model. Table 3.1 contains descriptive statistics of all the variables we used in the analysis.
Note that all means were weighted using the MEPS SAQ weight which adjusts for SAQ
non-response. In our estimation sample, 75 percent of all the individuals aged 18-64 were
employed and 9.1 percent suffered from depression based on the PHQ-2 index.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Employment
We report complete estimation results for the CRE probit models of employment in columns
(6) and (8), and the cross-sectional probit models for comparison purposes in columns (2)
9The industry indicators include: 1. natural resources/mining/construction/manufacturing; 2. wholesale
and retail trade/transportation and utilities; 3. professional and business services/education, health, and
social services; 4. other services/public administration/military/unclassifiable industry. We also included an
indicator for whether the reported occupation required professional training.
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and (4), of Table 3.7 in Appendix 3.7. In all of our models, the random effect capturing
unobserved heterogeneity was specified to be correlated with marital status, log of family
income (excluding the individual’s own income), the PCS score, and the depression measure
(index or indicator). Across all specifications, we found a negative and statistically signifi-
cant association between depression and employment. However, the magnitude of the CRE
estimates is substantially smaller than the cross-sectional estimates for both the continuous
PHQ-2 depression index and the dichotomous indicator for index values ≥ 3.
The average marginal effects derived from these estimates are reported in Table 3.2.
The cross-sectional estimates imply that depression is associated with a 17.6 percentage point
reduction in the probability of employment, which is similar in magnitude to the effect found
in previous studies (Ettner et al, 1997; Alexandre and French, 2001; Chatterji et al, 2011).
In contrast, the CRE estimates imply depression lowers the probability of employment by
only 2.6 percentage points, or 3.3 percent. This is similar to the marginal effect we obtain
from a linear probability model containing individual fixed effects.
The sizable and significant correlation parameters in Table 3.7 indicate that depres-
sion, along with marital status, physical health status, and income earned by other family
members, are endogenous in the reduced form estimating equation. This endogeneity is pre-
sumably caused by the failure to fully measure worker productivity and health status, which
are captured by the random effect in the CRE model. The downward bias on the effect of
depression on employment in the cross sectional model is consistent with a positive corre-
lation between unobserved productivity (or good health) and employment, and a negative
correlation between productivity and depression.
3.4.2 Hourly wage and weekly hours worked
Panel A of Table 3.3 contains marginal effects of depression on weekly work hours and the
hourly wage rate estimated using the conditional sample of workers. The cross-sectional es-
timates imply that depression is associated with an 8.3 percent reduction in the hourly wage,
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but this effect is small and imprecisely estimated using both CRE and individual fixed effects
to control for unmeasured productivity. We failed to find a relationship between depression
and weekly hours worked using either the cross-sectional or panel data specifications. The
correlation parameters from the CRE models reported in appendix Table 3.8 indicate that
the random effect is not correlated with the depression measure in the work hours model,
but that it is significantly correlated with depression in the wage equation.10 The latter is
consistent with the downward bias of depression on wages due to unmeasured worker pro-
ductivity in the cross sectional model. The marginal effects from both cross-sectional and
CRE ordered probit models for part-time versus full-time employment are reported in panel
B of Table 3.3. In the cross section, depression reduces the probability of working full time
by 1.5 percentage points while the CRE estimates again suggest that depression has no effect
on full-time work status.
3.4.3 Absenteeism and aggregate productivity costs of depression
Unlike wages or hours, which are relatively rigid due to labor contracts, work loss days
are potentially more responsive to the presence or onset of contemporaneous depression. We
report the coefficient estimates of the ZIOP model in Table 3.10. Note that the inflation part
of the model captures the effect of depression on the propensity to be sick enough to take days
off, while the ordered probit part of the model captures the effect of depression on the length
of sick leave. The coefficient estimates from the inflation equation indicate that the depressed
are more likely to take days off from work in general than are the non-depressed, although
this effect is not precisely estimated. For both the continuous and dichotomous measure,
the coefficient estimates of the PHQ-2 indexes are positive and statistically significant in the
ordered probit equation, indicating that conditional on taking days off from work, depression
increases the length of sick leave.
Marginal effects constructed from these coefficients are reported in Table 3.4. The
10Note that the wage rate in the CRE work hours models is assumed to be endogenous, and as a result,
is specified to be correlated with the random effect.
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treatment effect specification suggests that depression increases work loss days by 1.4 days
per year. This represents a one-third increase in work loss days relative to the mean in the
conditional sample of workers. Likewise, the marginal effect for the continuous PHQ-2 index
indicates that a one unit change in the index value increases work loss days by 0.6 days
per year. Although these are relatively large effects, the estimate from the cross-sectional
treatment effects model that fails to account for productivity differences across workers is
two and half times larger, while the estimate based on the continuous index is nearly twice
as large.
In addition, we examined whether depression has a differential impact on absenteeism
across worker groups. We stratified the sample by whether the individual had a retirement
plan as a proxy for salaried versus hourly paid jobs, and found that depression is associated
with a 43.3 percent increase in work loss days by workers without retirement plans (hourly
paid), and a 29.3 percent increase among workers with retirement plans (salaried). Given
that we controlled for whether the employer provided sick leave or paid time off to visit
medical care professionals, these estimates suggest that the cost of depression is greater for
lower paid workers.
Using our CRE estimates of the impact of depression on work loss days and informa-
tion on the weekly work hours and wage rates, we were able to calculate annual estimates of
the aggregate cost of depression due to workplace absenteeism for the U.S. working popula-
tion.11 In Table 3.5 we report the aggregate cost from 2005-2008 using our CRE estimates.
Since the MEPS asks the respondents to report whether they missed work for a half day or
more due to sickness or injury, we calculated two different estimates: Our upper bound esti-
mate assumes individuals always missed a full day of work, while our lower bound estimate
11For individuals who worked less than 70 hours per week, we assumed that they worked 5 days a week;
for those who worked more than 70 hours per week, we assumed that they worked 6 days a week. We then
calculated the daily wage by (weekly hours worked*hourly wage/number of days worked per week). The
total annual cost of depression is therefore the weighted sum of (daily wage*overall marginal effect) among
the depressed individuals. We imputed wages for the self-employed and included them in the aggregate cost
estimates. Since the 2003-2004 and 2009-2010 cohorts are excluded from the estimation sample, we did not
calculate the aggregate costs for 2004 and 2009.
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assumes they always missed a half day. We found that the annual total cost of workplace
absenteeism due to depression is relatively constant over time, and ranges from 0.7 to 1.4
billion in 2009 dollars.
3.5 Sensitivity Analysis
We performed several sensitivity checks of our main results. First, we re-estimated all of
our models after excluding control variables for union status, industry, occupation, em-
ployer size, and employer benefits (and wages). These variables could be endogenous if
those with depression seek employment only at firms with certain characteristics. While the
cross-sectional estimates of the impact of depression are sensitive to the exclusion of these
variables, the CRE estimates are not. Second, we tested whether the differences between the
cross-sectional and CRE estimates could be due to functional form misspecification rather
than unobservables. To address this, we re-estimated cross-sectional models after including
quadratic and cubic terms of all continuous variables, a full set of pairwise interaction terms,
and lags of all the variables that were specified to be correlated with unobserved heterogene-
ity in the CRE model.12 In the models of employment and log hourly wage, the estimated
effects of depression decreased after we added the interaction and lag terms (see Table 3.6).
However, the cross-sectional marginal effects are still sizeable and precisely estimated even
using this highly flexible specification.
Third, we used a broader measure of mental illness, the Kessler-6 (K-6) index, to
investigate whether our results are sensitive to the scale we use to measure depression. The
K-6 index is a standardized and validated measure of non-specific psychological distress, and
reflects a diagnosis of anxiety disorder, or mood disorder, or non-affective psychosis (Kessler
et al, 2002). Individuals who scored greater or equal to 13 (out of 24) are considered to
have serious mental illness.13 We re-estimated all models using the K-6 index and report
12Since for our panel, we only used the observations from the second year to include lags of time-varying
controls. As a result, point estimates from baseline models differed from the full sample estimates.
13In the MEPS, the K6 index was calculated based on questions that asked whether the respondent felt
“nervous”, “hopeless”, “fidget or restless”, “worthless”, “so sad that nothing could cheer the person up”,
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all the results in Appendix 3.7. These estimates are consistent with those from our primary
specifications using the PHQ-2, and maintain the pattern of CRE estimates of depression
that are smaller than those from the cross-sectional models.
Unfortunately, there is no direct way of assessing the robustness of panel data tech-
niques designed to account for unobserved heterogeneity without a confirmatory randomized
experiment or valid instrumental variables. However, one can assess how sensitive the cross-
sectional estimates are to selection on unobservables. If the cross-sectional estimates are very
sensitive to unobservables, this provides strong motivation for the CRE approach and sug-
gests the estimates are likely to be more reliable. Using the framework proposed by Altonji
et al (2005) we determined whether a modest degree of negative selection into depression on
unobservables could account for the whole effect of depression in the cross-sectional models.
Other studies that have applied the same framework include Altonji et al. (2008), Millimet
et al. (2010), and Chatterji et al. (2011). For example, Chatterji et al. (2011) demonstrated
the utility of this method in measuring associations between recent psychiatric disorders
and the probability of employment; a case where identifying instruments are not generally
available. We describe the details of this method in the appendix.
The results from this exercise suggest that the estimates from cross-sectional models
are very sensitive to selection on unobservables, and that even a modest level of negative
selection into depression can account for the entire estimated effects of depression on em-
ployment and hourly wage. Although this is not a direct check of our CRE estimates, it is
consistent with the significant differences we observe between the cross-sectional and CRE
models when worker productivity and health status are not fully observable. If unobserved
low productivity is positively correlated with depression and negatively correlated with em-
ployment and wages, we should find a smaller negative impact of depression on employment
and wages in the CRE models than the naive cross-sectional models.
and“everything is an effort” during the past 30 days.
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3.6 Discussion and Conclusions
It is difficult to empirically evaluate the disabling effects of mental health conditions like
depression. The main challenge in estimation is the endogeneity of mental health measures
in the structural model. In this paper, we achieved identification by accounting for time-
invariant unobserved differences in productivity and health that are potentially correlated
with both labor market outcomes and depression. We found that depression has a modest
negative effect on employment and a larger effect on absenteeism. However, we did not
find a statistically significant relationship between depression and wages or hours worked
conditional on employment.
Because we used a two period panel and measures of depression that were collected
contemporaneously with labor market outcomes, the effect of depression is identified off
of individuals who had a change in mental health status over approximately one calendar
year. As a result, our models capture the short-term effect of depression on labor market
outcomes. In contrast, studies that rely on exclusion restrictions for identification estimate
the long-term effect, based on cross-person variation in depression status. Such estimates
reflect the impact of suffering from depression for the average duration among individuals in
the estimation sample, which may well exceed one year.14
In the short run, the effect of depression on employment, wages, and hours worked
could be small due to stickiness in the labor market (i.e. fixed labor contracts). Moreover,
employers may not be able to immediately observe depression-induced changes in a workers
productivity, and may adjust their wages or hours slowly over time, or may delay making
a change to the workers employment status. This could explain why we found a smaller
negative effect of depression on employment than previous studies that address endogeneity
using instrumental variables (For example, Alexander and French (2001) reported a 19 per-
14Based on a sample of adults in the Netherlands, Spijker et al (2002) reported that in the general
population, the mean duration of major depressive episodes was 3 months; 76 percent of the depressed
individuals were able to recover within 12 months; and about 20 percent didn’t recover within 24 months.
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centage point reduction in the probability of employment). It may also be why we failed to
find a relationship between depression and both wages and work hours.
Another plausible explanation for the smaller effect we found is the time period of our
analysis. During 2004-2009 the use of mental health care increased substantially compared to
the 1990s when the NCS was administered. In particular, Soni (2012) reported that between
1999 and 2009, the number of adults treated for depression increased by 74 percent, and
the total health care expenditures for depression increased from 18 to 22.8 billion in 2009
dollars. Given the increasing effectiveness of depression treatment, greater use of mental
health services might have dampened the disabling effects of depression in more recent years
(Simon, 2002; Gibbons et al, 2012).
There are several limitations of our method. Although our identification strategy is
not dependent on exclusion restrictions, it hinges on the assumption that the way we model
unobserved heterogeneity fully accounts for the unobserved confounders of depression. In
all of our models, we specified the random effect in the structural model to be correlated
with marital status, income earned by other family members, physical health status, and
depression. This is reasonable if the main confounding factors are time-invariant unobserved
productivity and unobserved dimensions of physical and mental health status. We feel this
is plausible in the case of health status since variation in the PHQ-2 and PCS scores will
capture time-varying dimensions of mental and physical health, while age (conditional on
educational attainment) should capture changes in labor market experience, and as a result,
time-varying productivity. Nonetheless, if the error term has a time-varying component that
is also correlated with depression, our estimates will be biased.
In addition, we note that the CRE specification does not address the endogeneity of
depression due to reverse causality. This could be of a particular concern when modeling
the impact of depression on employment, since involuntary job loss and subsequent unem-
ployment can be very stressful, and has the potential to trigger an episode of depression.
Previous research provides support for negative impact of job loss and unemployment on
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mental health status (Tefft, 2011; Marcus, 2013). The failure to account for reverse causal-
ity would lead us to over-estimate the impact of depression on employment, which suggests
the short run effect of depression may be smaller than is indicated by our estimates. In
contrast, we expect reverse causality to have a much smaller, if any, impact on our estimates
of depression on work loss days, conditional on employment and our controls for physical
health.
Another limitation is that individuals with the most severe forms of mental illnesses
residing in institutions are not in the scope of the MEPS. One would expect the effect
of depression on employment to be larger for the full population. Finally, our structural
model captures the contemporaneous rather than the life-cycle effect of depression. While
a comprehensive assessment of the impact of depression on labor market outcomes would
consider both effects, the MEPS lacks information on the onset or duration of depression
necessary to estimate the latter.
In the aggregate, we found that the productivity loss in the U.S. economy due to
depression-induced absenteeism was between 700 million and 1.4 billion 2009 USD annually,
which is less than estimates from most previous studies. For example, Greenberg et al.
(2003) reported that the cost of depression from workplace absenteeism totaled 36.2 billion
in 2000 (current dollars). Birnbaum et al. (2010) estimated that monthly depression-related
productivity loss from both absenteeism and presenteeism was 2 billion, also in 2000 dol-
lars. Due to methodological differences, caution is needed when comparing our estimates
of aggregate costs with those from these studies. First, our aggregate cost estimates are
based on the short-term effect of depression on work loss days. Second, we did not attempt
to quantify the impact of depression on presenteeism, which cannot be calculated using the
MEPS without making an untestable assumption about how depression lowers productivity
at work. Third, previous studies may also overestimate the workplace productivity loss due
to absenteeism as a result of failure to address the endogeneity of depression.
Our findings have implications, in particular, for the substantial expansions of mental
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health coverage under the Affordable Care Act (ACA). Garfield et al (2011) estimate that
2.0 million previously uninsured Americans with severe mental disorders would gain coverage
under the individual and small group exchange provisions of the ACA.15 Mental health and
substance use services are considered essential benefits and must be covered at parity with
other health services in the exchanges. In defining the services as part of the essential benefit
package, the government extends mental health and substance abuse coverage well beyond
the newly insured. The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services estimates that 3.9
million Americans currently covered in the individual market and 1.2 million currently in
small group plans would gain mental health coverage under the essential benefit requirement
(Beronio et al, 2013). A further 7.1 million currently insured Americans in the individual
market and 23.3 million in the small group market with some form of mental health coverage
would now be guaranteed parity coverage (Beronio et al, 2013). Our estimates suggest that
some of these coverage expansions may be offset through less productivity loss.
15Garfield et al (2011) estimate that another 1.7 million Americans with severe mental disorders would
gain coverage under the Medicaid expansions if implemented in every state.
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Tables
Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics (N= 76,132; T = 2)
Variable Mean Standard deviation Min Max
Age 41.878 12.181 18 64
Age squared/100 19.021 10.259 3.24 40.96
Female 0.527 0.499 0 1
Married 0.583 0.493 0 1
White 0.672 0.469 0 1
Hispanic 0.148 0.355 0 1
Black 0.125 0.331 0 1
Other race 0.055 0.227 0 1
Urban 0.837 0.369 0 1
West 0.231 0.421 0 1
Midwest 0.224 0.417 0 1
South 0.367 0.482 0 1
Northeast 0.178 0.383 0 1
Education(years) 13.154 2.952 0 17
Number of children under 5 0.273 0.608 0 5
Number of children between 6 and17 0.573 0.941 0 9
Log family income (2009 USD) 6.953 4.448 0 12.965
Union 0.106 0.307 0 1
Employer size < 25 0.226 0.418 0 1
Employer size 25-99 0.178 0.383 0 1
Employer size 100-500 0.162 0.368 0 1
Employer size > 500 0.138 0.345 0 1
Sick pay 0.508 0.5 0 1
Retirement plan 0.444 0.497 0 1
Paid vacation 0.575 0.494 0 1
Industry construction & manufacturing 0.158 0.365 0 1
Industry professional & education 0.381 0.486 0 1
Industry transportation & utility 0.137 0.344 0 1
White collar occupation 0.564 0.496 0 1
PCS score 50.746 9.754 4.56 73.09
PHQ2 0.748 1.322 0 6
PHQ2 ≥ 3 0.091 0.287 0 1
Employed 0.75 0.433 0 1
Hourly wage (2009 USD) 15.463 14.909 0 84.632
Weekly hours worked 30.192 19.666 0 112
Annual work loss days 3.548 19.708 0 365
Notes: Means are weighted to be nationally representative.
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Table 3.2: Marginal effects of depression on employment
Cross-section Fixed-effects CRE
PHQ-2 index -0.042*** -0.012*** -0.011***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Depression (PHQ-2 ≥ 3 ) -0.176*** -0.033*** -0.026***
(0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
Notes: Significance level: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. Standard errors
in parentheses are adjusted for the complex survey design of the MEPS us-
ing balanced repeated replication. Models include cross-sectional and CRE
probit regressions and linear fixed-effects regressions. Control variables in-
clude age and its square, gender, race and ethnicity, marital status, years
of education completed before entering the survey, region, urban residence,
number of children under 5 or 18 in the household, log of income earned by
other family members (normalized by household size), PCS score, and year
dummies.
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Table 3.4: Marginal effect of depression on work loss
days
Cross-section CRE
PHQ-2 index 0.926*** 0.567***
(0.081) (0.083)
Depression (PHQ-2 ≥ 3) 3.359*** 1.382***
(0.498) (0.433)
Notes: Significance level: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
Standard errors in parentheses are adjusted for the com-
plex survey design of the MEPS using balanced repeated
replication. Models include cross-sectional and CRE zero-
inflated ordered probit regressions. Control variables in-
clude age and its square, gender, race and ethnicity, mar-
ital status, years of education completed before entering
the survey, region, urban residence, union status, employer
size (less than 25 employees, between 25-99 employees, be-
tween 100-500 employees, more than 500 employees), ben-
efits provided by the employer (sick pay, retirement plan,
and paid vacations), occupation and industry indicators,
number of children under 5 or 18 in the household, log of
income earned by other family members (normalized by
household size), and year dummies.
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Table 3.5: Annual cost of depression-induced absenteeism for employed adults aged 18-64
(Billions of 2009 USD; 90% C.I. in brackets)
Year
Total employed
population aged
18-64 (millions)
Total Population (full
day estimate)
Total population (half
day estimate)
2005 135.3 1.41 0.7
[0.66, 2.15] [0.33, 1.07]
2006 136.5
1.35 0.67
[0.63, 2.06] [0.32, 1.03]
2007 139.5
1.38 0.69
[0.63, 2.12] [0.32, 1.06]
2008 138.7
1.43 0.71
[0.67, 2.19] [0.33, 1.09]
2005-2008 average 137.6 1.39 0.69
[0.67, 2.11] [0.33, 1.06]
Notes: All confidence intervals are adjusted for the complex survey design of the MEPS. The
population estimates are obtained using the MEPS sampling weights. In order to obtain national
representative estimates, we adjusted the sampling weights to account for sample attrition of
the panel.
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Table 3.6: Marginal effects from cross-sectional models using more flexible
specifications
(1) (2) (3)
Employment -0.183*** -0.155*** -0.107***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Hour -0.189 -0.241 -0.397
(0.355) (0.362) (0.368)
Log wage -0.075*** -0.062*** -0.041**
(0.015) (0.014) (0.015)
Higher order and interactions terms No Yes Yes
Lags of correlated variables No No Yes
Notes: Significance level: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1; Standard errors in
parentheses are adjusted for the complex survey design of the MEPS using
balanced repeated replication. Models include cross-sectional probit and OLS
regressions. Control variables include age and its square, gender, race and eth-
nicity, marital status, years of education completed before entering the survey,
region, urban residence, union status, employer size (less than 25 employees,
between 25-99 employees, between 100-500 employees, more than 500 employ-
ees), benefits provided by the employer (sick pay, retirement plan, and paid
vacations), occupation and industry indicators, number of children under 5 or
18 in the household, log of income earned by other family members (normalized
by household size), and year dummies.
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3.7 Appendix
We describe in details how we implemented the method outlined in Altonji et al (2005).
Intuitively, the degree of selection on observables can be used as a guide to the degree of
selection on unobservables. In the case of binary outcome variable, consider the following
bivariate probit model:
Y = 1(X ′γ + αD + ε > 0), (3.17)
D = 1(X ′β + u > 0), (3.18)
where 1(·) is an indicator function, and it is assumed that u and ε follow a standard bivariate
normal distribution with correlation ρ. In the absence of valid exclusion restrictions, identifi-
cation of the bivariate probit model is achieved through the bivariate normality assumption.
Let Y ∗ be a latent variable underlying outcome Y such that
Y ∗ = αD +W ′Γ, (3.19)
where W is the full set of variables that determine Y ∗ and D is a binary indicator for
depression. In practice, we only observe a subset X of W , so we rewrite (3.19) as
Y ∗ = αD +X ′γ + ε. (3.20)
Note that in (3.20) γ and ε are defined so that Cov(X, ε) = 0. Similarly, let D∗ be the latent
variable underlying D and the linear projection of D∗ onto X ′γ and ε is
E(D∗|X ′γ, ε) = ϕ0 + ϕ1X ′γ + ϕ2ε. (3.21)
Then the assumption that selection on unobservables is the same as selection on observables
can be re-expressed as ϕ1 = ϕ2. In the bivariate probit framework, this condition can be
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replaced by
ρ∗ =
Cov(X ′β,X ′γ)
Var(X ′γ)
(3.22)
Setting ρ = 0 generates the cross-sectional estimate of α, and setting ρ = ρ∗ generates the
lower bound of α (Altonji et al, 2005). We followed a two-step procedure to approximate the
value of that satisfies equation (3.22). First, β and γ are estimated from an unconstrained
bivariate probit model, and then α is estimated from a constrained bivariate probit model
imposing the estimated value of ρ∗ from the first step.
We set ρ from 0 to -0.4, ρ∗ (-0.52 for our application) and ρ∗/2 (-0.26), and esti-
mated the constrained bivariate probit models on employment. The coefficient estimates
and marginal effects of the dichotomous PHQ-2 index are reported in Table 3.11. The neg-
ative effect of depression on employment decreases dramatically as negative selection on the
unobservables gets stronger. When ρ is set to -0.3, the coefficient estimate becomes positive
and the negative effect of depression goes away. This provides evidence that the cross-
sectional estimate is very sensitive to selection on unobservables, and that even a modest
level of negative selection on unobservables can reverse the direction of the estimated effect.
Under the assumption that selection along unmeasured factors is equal to selection along
measured factors (ρ = ρ∗), the coefficient estimate is positive and statistically significant.
Under this condition the elements of X are just a random subset of W , and are no more
useful than the unobserved elements of W in terms of reducing the bias in αˆ (Altonji et al,
2005). However, this assumption is likely to be too strong given that our models contain a
large number of socio-demographic controls, some of which (such as education and age) are
known to be strong determinants of employment.
Given the significant predictive power of the observables on employment, it is reason-
able to assume in our application that selection on unobservables is weaker than selection
on observables. The last column of Table 3.11 contains the marginal effect of depression
on employment under the constraint: ρ = 0.5ρ∗. In this case the marginal effect is slightly
smaller than that from our CRE model. Although it is impossible to know the true value
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of ρ, this suggests that the CRE specification generates estimates that are consistent with a
moderate degree of selection on unobservables.
In the case of continuous outcomes such as wages and hours worked, Altonji et al
(2005) provide a different method for assessing the role of unobservables. Here, the relevant
question is: Relative to the degree of selection on observables, how large should the selection
on unobservables be, to explain away the whole effect of depression? We write the linear
projection of D onto X as
D = X ′β + D˜. (3.23)
By substituting (3.23) into (3.20), we have
Y ∗ = αD˜X˜ ′(αβ + γ) + ε. (3.24)
Since D˜ is orthogonal to X by construction, the probability limit of the OLS estimator of α
can be written as
plimαˆ = α +
Cov(D˜, ε)
Var(D˜)
= α +
Var(D)
Var(D˜)
[E(ε|D = 1)− E(ε|D = 0)] .
(3.25)
The bias term in (3.25) is estimated under the assumption that the normalized degree of
selection on observables is equal to the normalized degree of selection on unobservables.
More formally, this is equivalent to
E(ε|D = 1)− E(ε|D = 0)
Var(ε)
=
E(X ′γ|D = 1)− E(X ′γ|D = 0)
Var(X ′γ)
(3.26)
Under the null hypothesis that depression has no effect (α = 0), it is possible to obtain a
consistent estimate of γ in (3.24). In this case, the term E(ε|D = 1) − E(ε|D = 0) can be
estimated using the variance of residual εˆ under (3.26). With the sample analog of Var(D)
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and Var(D˜) we can consistently estimate the bias term in (3.25). The ratio between the
unconstrained estimate of αˆ and the bias term
αˆ
[Var(D)/Var(D˜)]E(ε|D = 1)− E(ε|D = 0) (3.27)
is used to gauge how large selection on unobservables must be relative to selection on observ-
ables to fully account for the effect of depression. If the ratio is less than 1, then the effect
of depression in the OLS model is likely to be biased because it suggests the observed effect
of depression could result from a relatively small degree of selection along unobservable di-
mensions. We conducted this sensitivity analysis only for the hourly wage outcome because
depression is not associated with hours worked in either the cross-sectional or panel data
model. Our estimates indicate that the normalized shift in the distribution of unobservables
only needs to be around 30 percent of the normalized shift in the observables to explain away
the entire effect of depression.
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Table 3.9: CRE ordered probit model models of work hour categories
(1) (2) (3) (4)
K-6 index PHQ-2 index K-6≥13 PHQ-2≥3
Constant -0.248 -0.244 -0.258 -0.237
(0.208) (0.205) (0.206) (0.203)
Age 0.043*** 0.043*** 0.042*** 0.043***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
Age squared/100 -0.054*** -0.054*** -0.054*** -0.055***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Female -0.576*** -0.577*** -0.577*** -0.576***
(0.026) (0.027) (0.026) (0.026)
Hispanic 0.264*** 0.264*** 0.263*** 0.264***
(0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039)
Black 0.017 0.016 0.017 0.016
(0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035)
Other race 0.239*** 0.239*** 0.239*** 0.239***
(0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.058)
Urban -0.03 -0.03 -0.031 -0.03
(0.038) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037)
Union -0.140*** -0.140*** -0.140*** -0.140***
(0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040)
West 0.150*** 0.150*** 0.151*** 0.150***
(0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039)
Midwest 0.129*** 0.129*** 0.129*** 0.129***
(0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036)
South 0.336*** 0.336*** 0.336*** 0.336***
(0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036)
Education(years) -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.022***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Number of children under 5 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
Number of children between 6-17 -0.028** -0.028** -0.028** -0.028**
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Employer size < 25 -0.067** -0.067** -0.067** -0.067**
(0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031)
Employer size 25-99 0.074** 0.073** 0.074** 0.073**
(0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
Employer size 100-500 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.046
(0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.032)
Sick pay 0.396*** 0.395*** 0.396*** 0.396***
(0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036)
Retirement plan 0.318*** 0.318*** 0.318*** 0.318***
(0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029)
Paid vacation 0.626*** 0.625*** 0.625*** 0.625***
92
(0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.031)
Industry construction & manufacturing 0.519*** 0.518*** 0.520*** 0.518***
(0.054) (0.055) (0.054) (0.055)
Industry professional & education -0.183*** -0.183*** -0.182*** -0.183***
(0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040)
Industry transportation & utility -0.072 -0.072 -0.072 -0.072
(0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045)
White collar occupation -0.163*** -0.163*** -0.162*** -0.163***
(0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039)
Log wage 0.161** 0.161** 0.161** 0.162**
(0.066) (0.067) (0.067) (0.067)
Married 0.065* 0.065* 0.065* 0.064*
(0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036)
Log family income -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
PCS score -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Depression measure -0.002 -0.001 -0.032 -0.027
(0.002) (0.005) (0.032) (0.022)
Cutoffs
µ1 0.723*** 0.723*** 0.723*** 0.723***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Correlation parameters
Log wage period 1 -0.044 -0.044 -0.044 -0.044
(0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050)
Log wage period 2 0.159** 0.159** 0.161** 0.158**
(0.068) (0.069) (0.068) (0.068)
Married period 1 -0.140** -0.141** -0.142** -0.141**
(0.071) (0.071) (0.071) (0.071)
Married period 2 0.056 0.057 0.058 0.057
(0.072) (0.072) (0.072) (0.072)
Log family income period 1 -0.010** -0.010** -0.010** -0.010**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Log family income period 2 0.008* 0.008* 0.008* 0.008*
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
PCS score period 1 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
PCS score period 2 0.003 0.003* 0.003* 0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Depression measure period 1 -0.002 -0.007 0.083 -0.03
(0.003) (0.010) (0.066) (0.041)
Depression measure period 2 0.004 0.007 0.005 0.031
93
(0.004) (0.014) (0.087) (0.059)
Notes: The coefficients of the year dummies are omitted. Significance level: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05,
*p<0.1; Standard errors in parentheses are adjusted for the complex survey design of the MEPS using
balanced repeated replication. Base categories are white, northeast, employer size > 500, and other
services/public administration/military/unclassifiable industry.
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Chapter 4
The Heath Implications of
Unconventional Natural Gas
Development in Pennsylvania
4.1 Introduction
Natural gas has become a key source of energy in the United States. Over the past decades,
technological advancements in horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing (often referred to
as fracking) have made natural gas trapped beneath various shale formations more economi-
cally accessible. The contribution of shale gas to total U.S. natural gas production increased
drastically from less than 2 percent in 2000 to over 20 percent in 2010; it is also projected that
46 percent of natural gas supply will come from shale gas by 2035 (EIA, 2013). With this
rapid expansion of shale gas development, the potential health risks have drawn attention
from the public and regulators at various levels.
Typically, the process to develop shale gas wells involves well pad preparation and
construction, drilling and well construction, hydraulic fracturing, flaring of excess natural
gas, and gas extraction and compression. Air pollution can occur during each stage of the
process, while water contamination mostly occurs during wellbore drilling and hydraulic
fracturing (see Appendix 4.6.1 for a more detailed description of the stages of shale gas
development). Numerous studies have documented that emissions of greenhouse gases (pre-
dominantly water vapor, carbon dioxide, methane, and ozone), volatile organic compounds
99
(VOCs), other air pollutants, and hazardous chemicals increase as a result of unconventional
natural gas development (GAO, 2012). Based on data from a natural gas emissions inventory
recently created by the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection (PADEP),
levels of air pollutant emissions (CO, NOX, PM2.5, PM10, etc.) attributable to unconven-
tional natural gas drilling mostly increased between 2011 and 2012 as the number of gas
wells in the state rose by nearly 30% (see Table 4.1).1
Despite the fact that air pollution has clear adverse health effects, there is little
scientific research on the impact of shale gas development on human health (see Appendix
4.6.2 for a detailed discussion of the link between air pollution and human health). We know
of only one study that investigates the direct impact of shale gas development on health. In
particular, Hill (2012) found a higher incidence of low birth weight among babies born to
mothers living in the vicinity of shale gas wells in Pennsylvania. We examine the impact of
unconventional natural gas drilling in Pennsylvania on several air-pollution-sensitive medical
conditions. The state of Pennsylvania is rich in Marcellus shale reserves2 and has witnessed a
significant expansion of unconventional natural gas development in the past decade, making
it a good location to study the effects of drilling. We analyze detailed information on natural
gas drilling and production activities and all inpatient hospital admissions in the state from
2001-2013, which encompasses the recent expansion in unconventional natural gas extraction.
We estimate a set of fixed effects regressions models to control for unobserved time-invariant
county-level attributes that might otherwise confound our analyses, and identify the effect
of Marcellus well development on the county-level hospitalization rates for acute myocardial
infarction (AMI), chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), asthma, pneumonia, and
upper respiratory infections (URI). We find that unconventional natural gas development
was associated with a significant increase in rates of URI among adults of all ages, and high
1These data are released by Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection (PADEP). URL:
http://www.portal.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt/community/emission_inventory/21810/
marcellus_inventory/1829
2Marcellus shale (also known as the Marcellus formation) is a geological formation found in eastern North
America, spanning 6 states in the northeast U.S.. It is a unit of marine sedimentary rock that contains largely
untapped natural gas reserves.
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hospitalization rates for AMI and asthma among young adults. We also find that shale gas
development increased the hospitalization rate for pneumonia among both young adults and
the elderly. These findings are consistent with higher levels of air pollution.
4.2 Data
We obtained data on natural gas wells from the PADEP Oil and Gas Reports. The Spud
Data Report contains information on the drilling commencement date (i.e. spud date), lo-
cation, operator, and configuration of all conventional and unconventional natural gas wells
drilled in Pennsylvania between 2001 and 2013. Unfortunately, these data do not include
the well completion date, which indicates when the well is ready to produce natural gas.3
We also obtained data on total annual gas production from the PADEP statewide well pro-
duction database, which contains this information for all active natural gas wells. We linked
spud dates to the gas production data using a unique well permit number, allowing us to
determine the annual gas production for each active well after its spud date. Table 4.2
contains a list of all Pennsylvania counties that had unconventional natural gas wells drilled
during the timeframe of this study. Our health outcome measures are derived from the
Pennsylvania Health Care Cost Containment Councils (PHC4) compilation of all inpatient
hospital admission records in the state during 2001-2013. We use ICD-9-CM codes to iden-
tify the main diagnosis for each inpatient admission and then group related diagnoses into
clinically meaningful categories using the Clinical Classification Software (CCS) developed
by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) (see Appendix Table 4.4 for
how each condition is defined).4 We focus our analysis on the following five health conditions
that are sensitive to air pollution: acute myocardial infarction (AMI), chronic obstructive
3For wells that begin producing immediately after drilling, the spud date and completion date are the
same.
4The Clinical Classifications Software (CCS) for ICD-9-CM is developed as part of the Healthcare Cost
and Utilization Project (HCUP); a federal-state-industry partnership sponsored by the Agency for Healthcare
Research and Quality. It is a diagnosis and procedure categorization scheme that can be employed to collapse
ICD-9-CM codes into a smaller number of clinically meaningful categories. The CCS can be accessed at
http://www.hcup-us.ahrq.gov/toolssoftware/ccs/ccs.jsp.
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pulmonary disease (COPD), asthma, pneumonia, and upper respiratory infections (URI).
Although many known or possible carcinogenic chemicals are used during the well develop-
ment process (such as the BTEX compound), we do not consider cancer in this analysis due
to the short time frame of our data.5 Persistent correlations between the above five condi-
tions and air pollution have been established in the epidemiological literature (for example,
see Lee, Kim and Lee (2014); Garshick (2014); Neupane et al. (2010); Schwartz et al. (1993);
Dockery and Pope (1994); Dominici et al. (2006); Brunekreef and Holgate (2002); Eder, Ege
and von Mutius (2006)).
4.3 Empirical methods
We stratify the sample into four age groups: 5-19, 20-44, 45-64, and above 65 because the
pollution caused by shale gas development might have a more pronounced effect on one age
group than others. For example, elderly individuals with a pre-existing respiratory illness
are more sensitive to air pollution, and are more likely than younger individuals to contract
pneumonia (Ryan et al. (2013)). Because hospitalization rates for AMI and COPD are either
very low or zero among children ages 5-19, we only estimate models for asthma, pneumonia,
and URI for this age group. In each year, we construct county-level measures of the five
health conditions by first aggregating the individual-level PHC4 data into county-year cells,
and then normalizing the total number of inpatient admissions for each condition by the
population of that county in each age group,6 so that the measures reflect hospitalizations
per one thousand people.
The average hospitalization rates for AMI, COPD, asthma, pneumonia, and URI
are higher in counties containing unconventional natural gas wells than those without wells
(Appendix Figures 4.2-4.6 contain trends in hospitalization rates over time in well and non-
5For example, a recent study measuring the impact of diesel exhaust exposure on the incidence of lung
cancer among miners used a 15-year lag between the time of exposure and diagnosis of the illness (see Attfield
et al. (2012)).
6These data are obtained from the Census Bureau Population Estimates Program, which can be accessed
at http://www.census.gov/popest/
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well counties for each condition and age group). This is likely because poverty rates are
28% higher in well counties, on average, and the fact that these counties have much higher
levels of extraction of other natural resources, such as coal (see Table 4.3). Furthermore, the
hospitalization rates for certain conditions and age groups exhibit strong secular trends over
time in both well and non-well counties. In order to address both of these issues, we estimate
the impact of unconventional natural gas development on county-level hospitalization rates
using linear regressions containing fixed effects for county and year. This is sometimes
referred to as a difference-in-difference specification because the estimates represent changes
in hospitalization rates over time in well counties relative to changes in hospitalization rates
over time in non-well counties. To assess the robustness of our results, we additionally
estimate models that contain: 1) a linear time trend; or 2) linear, quadratic and cubic time
trends instead of year fixed effects (see Appendix 4.6.3 for a more detailed discussion of the
econometric model).
Another important consideration is that air pollution may come from gas well de-
velopment activities (site construction, drilling, and initial hydraulic fracturing) as well as
ongoing extraction activities (gas production, compression, and fuel transportation).7 De-
veloped activities occur prior to and in the same year as the well spud date, while extraction
activities occur after the spud date. Therefore, we include in our regressions a set of binary
indicator variables representing whether there is at least one active unconventional well in
the county in the preceding (lag), current, or following (lead) year. Since we only know the
spud date for each well, the 1-year lead indicator captures the adverse health effects of well
site preparation and construction. The current-year indicator captures both the contempora-
neous effect of drilling and hydraulic fracturing and the lagged effect of site preparation and
construction; and the 1-year lag indicator captures the lagged response to all development
activities. In order to measure the impact of ongoing extraction activities, we aggregate
7It may be necessary to re-stimulate (also known as re-fracturing or well workovers) the wells throughout
the production period by repeating the hydraulic fracturing process, the frequency of which depends on the
characteristics of geologic formation and production phase of a particular well.
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natural gas production from unconventional wells to the county level, and include in our
models the log of county-level total output8 in preceding and current year.
Our models also contain control variables for county-level demographic composition,
economic conditions and activities, as well as measures of patient characteristics at each
countys hospitals (see Table 4.3). Specifically, we include the county-level unemployment
rate, poverty rate, the log of county population density, quartiles of county median household
income,9 and the percentage of the county population in each five-year age category, from
0-4 to 85 and above.10 These measures are derived from Small Area Income and Poverty
Estimates (SAIPE) and the Population Estimates Program (PEP) data made available by
the U.S. Census Bureau.
Greater availability and lower prices of natural gas may reduce the demand for other
fuels that generate pollution during their extraction and use (EPA, 1999; NRC, 2010). As
unconventional natural gas extraction in Pennsylvania has increased, the extraction of coal
for electricity generation has decreased. In order to capture this substitution of fuels we
include in our models the log of annual county-level production of coal from surface and
underground mining reported to the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA).
Finally, we construct county-level measures of patient characteristics from the PHC4
inpatient admission records and include these in our models. These are the county-level
proportion of female patients, the proportion of patients of different racial and ethnic cate-
gories (white, black, Asian, Hispanic, and other races), the proportion of different types of
admissions (elective, urgent, emergency, and other types), and the proportion of patients in
mutually exclusive insurance categories (private insurance, Medicaid, Medicare, other gov-
8We add 1 to the level of output in counties without wells.
9We use the annual quartiles of household income due the methodological changes in SAIPE. For the
series of SAIPE state and county estimates, notable differences include the break between 2004 and 2005
due to the switch from Current Population Survey Annual Social and Economic Supplement (CPS ASEC) to
American Community Survey (ACS) data in SAIPE modeling. For that reason, estimates for these particular
years are directly comparable.
10The Intercensal Population Estimates released by the U.S. Census Bureau provide estimates of county-
level population by five-year age groups. We include percentages of population in each age group for each
county-year in all of our models to account for the demographic changes in the counties.
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ernment insurance, self-pay, and all other payers), and the county average Charlson index
(Charlson et al. (1987)).11 In Table 4.3 we report descriptive statistics for all variables
used in this analysis by age group. As expected, the county-level hospitalization rates for
pollution-sensitive conditions, and the Charlson index increase with age.
4.4 Results
Overall, the estimates from our empirical models suggest that unconventional natural gas
development is positively and consistently associated with significantly higher rates of hos-
pitalization for all but one of the five pollution-sensitive conditions. There are, however,
differences across the conditions in which age groups are most affected and at what point in
time gas development translates into higher hospitalization rates. We summarize the results
of our each model below (see Figure 4.1), focusing on our preferred specification with county
and year fixed effects, and report our full set of estimates, including models with a linear
time trend, and a linear, quadratic, and cubic time trend in Appendix Table 4.5:
AMI: Unconventional well development in the previous year is associated with an
increase of 0.11 hospital admissions per one thousand people aged 20-44, which is a 24 percent
increase relative to the state average hospitalization rate for AMI for this age group. We
do not find any statistically significant effects of variables indicating wells in the previous,
current, or following year for the other age groups. We do find that higher levels of gas output
in the previous year are associated with higher rates of AMI hospitalizations among those
aged 45-64 in the models that contain time trend controls, but this result is not statistically
significant in our preferred specification with year fixed effect.
COPD: Among individuals aged 20-44, we find that well development measured
in the current year is associated with an increase of 0.07 admissions for COPD per one
thousand people, while well development in the previous year is associated with a decrease
of 0.08 admissions per one thousand people. Because these two effects offset each other, this
11To avoid endogeneity, we only use contemporaneous secondary diagnoses when computing the Charlson
index.
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result may reflect a temporary shift in hospitalizations one year earlier (i.e. well development
accelerates COPD hospitalizations, but does not cause a higher overall hospitalization rate).
For individuals aged 65 and above, we find that well development in the following year is
associated with an increase of approximately 0.6 admissions per one thousand people, which
is a 5 percent increase relative to the state average. Although this estimate is not statistically
significant in our preferred specification, the magnitude of the estimate increases slightly and
becomes significant at the 5% level in the two specifications containing time trend variables
instead of year fixed effects.
Asthma: Although we find a statistically significant association between previous
year well development and higher hospitalizations for individuals aged 20-44, the sensitivity
analyses we present below indicate that this result could be spurious. We do not find any
consistent associations among other age groups.
Pneumonia: We find that unconventional well development in the following year
is associated with an increase of 0.1 admissions per one thousand people, or 10 percent,
among individuals aged 20-44. In contrast, it is well development in the previous year that
is associated with an increase of 1.6 admissions per one thousand people among the elderly.
This is a 9 percent increase relative to the state average.
URI: We find a positive and consistent correlation between unconventional gas well
development and URI hospitalizations across all age groups, except for children aged 5-
19. Well development in the following year is associated with an increase of 0.05 and 0.04
admissions per one thousand people for individuals aged 20-44 and 45-64, respectively. For
the elderly, well development in the previous year is associated with an increase of 0.2
admissions per one thousand people. When compared to the state average of hospitalization
rates for URI in each age group, these effects represent increases of 38 percent, 14 percent,
and 17 percent, respectively.
In order test to robustness of our results, we conduct a falsification test and simula-
tion designed to measure the likelihood of spurious correlation between the well development
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indicators and the outcome variables. Importantly, our estimates are reliable only if model
either captures or removes county-level factors that are correlated with both unconventional
well development and hospitalization rates. Our falsification test considers of hospitaliza-
tions for trauma-related disorders12 as an alternative outcome. These disorders should not
be related to pollution, so finding a statistically significant impact of well development on
trauma hospitalizations would indicate the presence of uncontrolled unobservable factors
that are confounding the relationship between well development and the other health out-
comes. In addition, hospitalizations for trauma are very common, so this falsification test
has good statistical power. In support of our empirical approach, we do not find any statis-
tically significant correlations between the well development or gas output variables and the
hospitalization rate for trauma-related disorders. We also estimated several alternative spec-
ifications, including one set of model that excludes county characteristics and another set of
models containing county-specific-specific log-linear time trends. Our results are generally
not sensitive to either of these alternative specifications.13
Next, we conduct a Monte Carlo simulation designed to detect spurious correlations
between the well development indicators and outcome variables, which is described in Ap-
pendix section 4.6.4 and Table 4.6. For all of our statistically significant estimates except
those of the impact of well development in the previous year on asthma among individuals
age 20-44, the simulations indicate the probability of a Type I error (incorrectly rejecting the
null hypothesis of no effect) is no higher than the standard levels of statistical significance
we report to indicate the strength of the associations (1%, 5%, or 10%). However, in the
case of asthma, the simulation suggests that the probability of a Type I error is not 10%,
but closer to 18%, which is higher than conventional standards.
12These conditions include joint dislocations, fractures, intracranial injury, crushing injury or internal
injury, open wounds, burns, and other conditions due to external cause.
13These results are available upon request.
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4.5 Discussion and conclusions
We examine the impact of unconventional natural gas development, which is known to cause
air pollution, on human health. Our results show that activities surrounding horizontal
drilling and hydraulic fracturing into Marcellus shale in the state of Pennsylvania over the
past decade are associated with significant increases in hospitalization rates for AMI (aged
20-44), COPD (aged 20-44 and 65 and above), pneumonia (aged 20-44 and 65 and above),
and URI (aged 20-44, 45-64, and 65 and above). Notably, we do not find any impact of
gas well development on asthma, pneumonia, or URI among children aged 5-19. Because
children spend more time outdoors, breath more rapidly than adults, and breath through
their mouths rather than filtering air through their nose, their exposure to air pollution is
typically assumed to be higher than adults (OEHHA and ALA, 2003). It is possible that the
impact of air pollution from well development has a longer term impact on children through
the development of respiratory and other illnesses that we are unable to detect during the
limited timeframe of our analysis. In contrast, the effects we find among adults may reflect
the acute aggravation of pre-existing conditions. Nonetheless, differences in exposure within
the group of adults could explain why, for example, unconventional gas well development
has a statistically impact on AMI hospitalizations among young adults aged 20-44, but not
older adults who spend relatively less time outdoors.
Another noteworthy finding is that nearly all of the adverse effects we identify are due
to well development and not natural gas extraction and compression. The only exception is
a significant association between lagged gas output and AMI hospitalizations among 45-64
year olds, which is not precisely estimated in our preferred model. A likely source of air
pollution during well development are the diesel engines that power heavy equipment used
to build roads, clear well sites, construct wells, drill, and inject fracking fluid into the wells.
Horizontal drilling followed by hydraulic fracturing is more energy intensive than traditional
vertical drilling, and the diesel engines used to pump fracking fluid commonly exceed 2000
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bhp (Treida, 2010).
Our results indicate that the pollution caused by well development takes a longer
time to impact the health of some age groups than others. In particular, gas development
has an immediate effect on pneumonia and URI hospitalization rates among younger adults
captured by our one year lead variable, but a lagged effect on the elderly. This could be due to
differences in the exposure or susceptibility to air pollution across these different age groups.
Identifying the precise mechanisms through which air pollution from unconventional well
development impacts the health of different age groups is beyond the scope of this analysis,
but certainly worthy of further investigation.
Our analysis does have some limitations that should be kept in mind when inter-
preting our results. The large-scale development of Marcellus shale has inevitably caused
migration into affected communities by gas workers and other individuals seeking jobs cre-
ated by greater economic activity associated with growth in the gas industry. Likewise, shale
gas development has resulted in out-migration by individuals that have sold their land to
gas companies, or have been displaced by rising cost of housing in well counties. We have
included variables in our empirical models that capture changes in the county-level age dis-
tribution over time. Nonetheless, if the net impact of migration was to increase (decrease)
the number of individuals with pollution-sensitive diseases in well counties, or decrease (in-
crease) the number of individuals with these conditions in non-well counties, our estimates
will be upwardly (downwardly) biased. Despite these limitations, our study is the first to
establish a consistent link between unconventional natural gas extraction and higher rates
of disease. Our results have important implications for public policy because they provide
evidence of an adverse impact of shale gas development on health which is currently of
concern to policy makers. For example, in April 2012, the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA), Department of Energy, and Department of Interior agreed to collaborate on
research in order to improve the scientific understanding of hydraulic fracturing. The EPA
also launched a national study (still ongoing) to investigate the potential impact of hydraulic
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fracturing on drinking water resources. In 2010 and 2011, the Pennsylvania DEP conducted
three short-term studies to determine whether shale gas development affects air quality in
the southwestern, northeastern, and northcentral regions of the state. In all three studies,
natural gas constituents and associated compounds were detected in the air near Marcellus
shale drilling operations, but the DEP concluded that none of the compounds reached a level
of concentration that could cause air-related health issues (PADEP, 2011a; 2011b; 2011c).
However, a recent study conducted by the Southwest Pennsylvania Environmental Health
Project (SWPA-EHP), a non-profit environmental health organization, found short-term
high values of particulate matter in the air and concluded that current methods of collecting
and analyzing air pollutants emission data are not sufficiently accurate for evaluating the
health risks of unconventional natural gas development (Brown et al., 2014a).
In the absence of strong scientific evidence on the relationship between shale gas
development and health, states in the mid-Atlantic region have demonstrated conflicting
regulatory objectives. In February 2012 the Pennsylvania General Assembly passed Act 13,
which was a major overhaul of the states oil and gas law. According to the new law, mu-
nicipal governments are not allowed to impose stricter regulations on drilling activities than
other industries and must allow oil and gas operations in all zoning districts (The General
Assembly of Pennsylvania, 2011). This portion of the law resulted in disputes between lo-
cal communities and state government and was subsequently ruled unconstitutional by the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court (Cusick, 2013). In contrast, the state of New York banned
natural gas extraction activities that involve hydraulic fracturing in 2008 through a de facto
moratorium on shale development. The ban was renewed in June 2014 for the second time
(first time in 2013), and prohibits hydraulic fracturing in the state until 2017 (New York
State Assembly, 2013).
We seek to inform future regulatory policy on unconventional natural gas development
by providing evidence on the link between Marcellus shale gas development and health.
Because we find that unconventional natural gas well development has a stronger link to
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poor health than post-development gas production, there is more limited justification for
natural gas extraction taxes based on pollution-related externalities than per-well fees (for
example, under Pennsylvania’s Act 13 of 2012, operator have to pay an annual ”impact
fee” on every Marcellus well they drill). However, our results demonstrate a clear need for
additional studies to confirm the precise causal pathways between unconventional gas well
development, elevated levels of air pollution, and adverse health effects among different age
groups.
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Tables
Table 4.1: Statewide air emissions from unconventional natural gas devel-
opment in Pennsylvania, 2011-2012
Emissions (tons) 2011 2012 change (%)
Air pollutants
CO 6852 7350 7.26%
NOx 16542 16361 -1.09%
PM-10 577 600 4.05%
PM-2.5 505 548 8.56%
SOx 122 101 -17.32%
VOC 2820 4024 42.69%
Benzene 20 25 26.97%
Ethyl Benzene 5 6 11.25%
Formal dehyde 251 374 48.93%
n-Hexane 51 98 92.96%
Toluene 34 33 -2.64%
Xylenes 26 34 32.30%
2,2,4-Trimethyl pentane 4 19 439.11%
Greenhouse gases
CO2 N/A 4291316 N/A
Methane N/A 123884 N/A
Nitrous Oxide N/A 209.3 N/A
Number of active unconventional wells 4052 5253 29.64%
Notes: These emission data are only for drilling and production phases, and
do not include the emissions from the well pad construction phase. Emissions
for CO2, methane, and nitrous oxide are not available for 2011.
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Table 4.2: List of counties with unconventional natural gas wells
County name Drilling Year County name Drilling Year
Allegheny 2008 Susquehanna 2006
Armstrong 2009 Tioga 2006
Beaver 2009 Venango 2011
Bedford 2010 Warren 2007
Blair 2010 Washington 2002
Bradford 2005 Wayne 2008
Butler 2006 Westmoreland 2003
Cambria 2009 Wyoming 2009
Cameron 2008 Non-well counties
Centre 2007 Adams Philadelphia
Clarion 2007 Berks Pike
Clearfield 2007 Bucks Schuylkill
Clinton 2008 Carbon Snyder
Columbia 2010 Chester Union
Crawford 2012 Cumberland York
Elk 2005 Dauphin
Fayette 2006 Delaware
Forest 2009 Erie
Greene 2006 Franklin
Huntingdon 2010 Fulton
Indiana 2003 Juniata
Jefferson 2008 Lancaster
Lackawanna 2009 Lebanon
Lawrence 2011 Lehigh
Luzerne 2010 Mifflin
Lycoming 2007 Monroe
Mckean 2006 Montgomery
Mercer 2012 Montour
Potter 2007 Northampton
Somerset 2004 Northumberland
Sullivian 2010 Perry
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Figure 4.1: Additional hospitalizations per 1,000 people due to unconventional natural gas
well development
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4.6 Appendix
4.6.1 Shale gas development process
Unlike conventional natural gas development, extracting natural gas from unconventional
formations relies heavily on horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing. Typically, operators
first construct a well pad at the location suitable for drilling, build infrastructure, and
transport equipment to the drilling site. In the next stage, a hole (wellbore) is drilled into
the earth through a combination of vertical and horizontal drilling. Casing14 and cement
are inserted into the wellbore in order to isolate it from the surrounding formation. Finally,
hydraulic fracturing is used to stimulate the shale formation. This involves the injection of
highly pressurized fracturing fluid through the holes created by a perforating tool inserted
in the casing and cement. As fracturing fluid is forced into the surrounding formation,
fractures or cracks are created or expanded in the target formation. The underlying gas
is then released and collected. It is worth noting that throughout the production period
it may be necessary to re-stimulate (also known as re-fracturing or well workovers) the
wells by repeating the hydraulic fracturing process, the frequency of which depends on the
characteristics of geologic formation and production phase of a particular well (GAO, 2012;
DOE, 2009). When estimating annual green house gas emission from natural gas production,
the Environmental Protection Agency use the assumption that 10 percent of unconventional
wells need re-stimulation every year (EPA, 2012).
4.6.2 Potential public health risks
Shale gas development and production may pose a threat to public health through air pol-
lution (NRDC, 2014). First, the construction of infrastructure at the drilling site requires
massive transportation of water, sand, chemicals, and heavy machinery. Air pollutants such
14Casing is a metal pipe that is inserted inside the wellbore to prevent high pressure fluids outside the
formation from entering the well and to prevent drilling mud inside the well from fracturing fragile sections
of the wellbore.
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as nitrogen oxides (NOX) and particulate matters (PM) contained in the engine exhaust
brought about by increased traffic are released into the atmosphere. In addition, the devel-
opment and production process requires substantial amount of power, which is often supplied
by diesel engines. The burning of diesel fuel also generates exhaust. Second, for operational
reasons, flaring (burning) or venting (direct release into the atmosphere) of natural gas during
the development and production process is sometimes necessary, which leads to emissions of
carbon dioxide and the release of methane and volatile organic compounds (VOCs). Third,
evaporation of fracturing fluid and produced water may also emit hazardous chemicals into
the atmosphere. 4, 5 Some of the air pollutants and chemicals from the drilling and gas pro-
duction activities may be harmful to human health and even carcinogenic. NOX can form
small particles through reactions with ammonia, moisture, and other compounds. These
particles penetrate deeply into the sensitive part of lungs and cause or worsen respiratory
diseases (EPA, 1998). In addition, when reacting with VOCs in the presence of heat and
sunlight, NOX can form ground-level Ozone (smog), which irritates the respiratory system,
reduces lung function, aggravates chronic conditions such as asthma and chronic bronchitis,
and potentially results in permanent lung damage (EPA, 2009).
Particulate matter (PM) is also harmful. Short-term exposure to fine particles can
cause asthma attacks and acute bronchitis, and increases the risk of heart attacks and ar-
rhythmias among people with heart disease (EPA, 2003). There are a multitude of studies
that attempt to uncover the link between air pollution and adverse health outcomes. In
general, researchers have found consistent evidence that air pollution is associated with res-
piratory problems. For example, Ko et al. (2007) find that levels of major air pollutants
(NO2, O3, PM10, and PM2.5) in Hong Kong were associated with increased hospital ad-
missions, with O3 being the most important contributor. Likewise, Zanobetti and Schwartz
(2006) find that air pollution in the greater Boston area was associated with a higher risk of
hospitalization for pneumonia among individuals aged 65 and older .
Colborn et al. (2011) compile a list of 632 chemicals used during the fracturing and
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drilling stages of natural gas development and report that many of them could have a negative
impact on human health. In particular, more than 75 percent of the chemicals could affect
the respiratory system; about half could affect the immune and cardiovascular systems; and
25 percent could cause cancer. A similar analysis was conducted in a congressional report
by the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the U.S. House of Representatives. The
report reviews the type and volume of hydraulic fracturing products used by 14 leading oil
and gas companies between 2005 and 2009 and finds that the most widely used chemical
during that period was methanol, which is a hazardous air pollutant, and that more than
650 hydraulic fracturing products contain 29 chemicals that are known or possible human
carcinogens (Committee on Energy and Commerce, U.S. House of Representatives, 2011).
These chemicals are either regulated under the Safe Drinking Water Act for their risks to
human health, and/or listed as hazardous air pollutants under the Clean Air Act. For
instance, the BTEX compounds (benzene, toluene, xylene, and ethylbenzene) were found in
many of the hydraulic products. Each BTEX compound is a regulated contaminant under
the Safe Drinking Water Act and a hazardous air pollutant under the Clean Air Act. Benzene
alone is also known to be carcinogenic.
4.6.3 Empirical methods
The baseline econometric model for our empirical analysis is
yct = X
′
ctβ + α1Wc,t−1 + α2Wct + α3Wc,t+1 + γ1Lct + γ2Lc,t−1 + ψc + ζt + uct, (4.1)
where yct is the health outcome of interest in county c and year t, Xct is a vector of county
characteristics, Wc,t−1 (Wct or Wc,t+1) is is an indicator variable that equals to one if there
are active unconventional wells in the county in the previous (current or following) year,15
Lc,t−1 (or Lc,t+1) is the log of natural gas output16 from all active unconventional wells in
15Once an unconventional well is drilled, a county remains ”treated” for the rest of the sample period.
16Natural gas output is measured in thousand cubic feet (MCF).
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the county in the previous (current) year, and uit is a random error term assumed to be
uncorrelated with Xct, Wc,t−1, Wct, Wc,t+1, Lc,t−1, and Lct (we add 1 to the level of output
in counties without wells because the output is equal to 0 for them). In order to control
for time invariant unobserved county-level heterogeneity and overall secular trends in the
outcomes, we include a set of county fixed effects, ψc, and time effects, ζt. For each outcome,
we estimate three models with different time effects: (1) year fixed effects; (2) a linear time
trend; and (3) linear, quadratic and cubic time trends.
The parameters of interest, α1, α2, α3, γ1, and γ2 capture the reduced-form effects
of Marcellus shale gas development and production on the county-level hospitalization rate
for each medical condition. Since α1, α2, and α3 are coefficients on variables that indicate
the presence of unconventional wells (i.e. treatment effects), they measure the change in
hospitalization rates over time in counties with unconventional wells relative to the change
in hospitalization rates over time in non-well counties when the specification includes county
and year fixed effects. When the specification includes continuous time trend variables, these
coefficients measure the within-county change in hospitalizations relative to the overall trend
in hospitalization rates across all counties.
4.6.4 Monte Carlo simulation
Using a Monte Carlo simulation, we investigate whether our findings could result from spu-
rious correlation between drilling activity and county-level disease trends. The simulation
results indicate that the potential for unobservable county-level attributes to confound our
findings in this manner is small.
In order to conduct the simulation we first subset the sample to 2000 - 2005, the
period before unconventional drilling in Marcellus shale began, and then randomly assign
the treatment of unconventional wells to counties that contained wells in the post-2005
period. These wells are assigned by drawing the year of drilling in the pre-well period from
a uniform distribution. We then estimate equation (1) for each condition with the lead,
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current, and lagged placebo treatment indicators and year fixed effects, but without the
output variables.
Provided there are no unobserved determinants of hospitalization rates in well coun-
ties, the coefficients on the placebo treatment variables should be statistically significant
under a t-test at the same rate at the α level of the test (i.e. the Type 1 error rate). If,
however, we find a spurious correlation between the placebo treatment and hospitalization
rates at a higher rate than the α level of the test, it indicates that there are unobservable
differences in factors determining hospitalization rates that are not accounted for by our
models, which may lead us to incorrectly conclude that there is a statistically significant
relationship between shale gas development and health. We report the 1%, 5%, and 10% re-
jection rates for the placebo treatments for the models corresponding to our health outcomes
in Table 4.6.
In general, our simulation results indicate that we are no more likely to commit a
type 1 error than under the classical linear regression assumptions. For example, we find an
effect of the 1-year lag indicator for well development on pneumonia among individuals aged
65 and above that is statistically at 1 percent level, and in our simulation the rejection rate
at the same level of significance for this variable is 0.88 percent. However, there is one case
where the rejection rate from our simulation is noticeably different from the probability of a
type I error; this is for the lagged effect of well development on asthma among individuals
aged 20-44. Although our estimated suggest the coefficient on this variable is statistically
significant at the 10 percent level, our simulations show that the probability of finding a
”false positive” for asthma in this case is in fact 18 percent. As a result, we believe this
particular estimation result is unreliable. But overall, the simulations lend credibility to our
main findings.
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Table 4.4: ICD-9-CM diagnosis codes for all five conditions
AMI
4100 41000 41001 41002 4101 41010 41011 41012 4102 41020 41021 41022 4103 41030 41031
41032 4104 41040 41041 41042 4105 41050 41051 41052 4106 41060 41061 41062 4107 41070
41071 41072 4108 41080 41081 41082 4109 41090 41091 41092
COPD
490 4910 4911 4912 49120 49121 49122 4918 4919 4920 4928 494 4940 4941 496
Asthma
49300 49301 49302 49310 49311 49312 49320 49321 49322 49381 49382 49390 49391 49392
Pneumonia
00322 0203 0204 0205 0212 0221 0310 0391 0521 0551 0730 0830 1124 1140 1144 1145 11505
11515 11595 1304 1363 4800 4801 4802 4803 4808 4809 481 4820 4821 4822 4823 48230 48231
48232 48239 4824 48240 48241 48242 48249 4828 48281 48282 48283 48284 48289 4829 483
4830 4831 4838 4841 4843 4845 4846 4847 4848 485 486 5130 5171
URI
4660 4661 46611 46619 0320 0321 0322 0323 0340 460 4610 4611 4612 4613 4618 4619 462
4640 46400 46401 46410 46411 46420 46421 46430 46431 4644 46450 46451 4650 4658 4659
4730 4731 4732 4733 4738 4739 78491
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